The Risk Management Role of Accounting Conservatism for Operating Cash Flows by Song, FM et al.
Title The Risk Management Role of Accounting Conservatism forOperating Cash Flows
Author(s) Biddle, GC; Ma, ML; Song, FM
Citation
University of Western Australia
Accounting and Finance Research Forum, Perth, Australia, June
2012
Issued Date 2012
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/152528
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
The Risk Management Role of Accounting Conservatism  
for Operating Cash Flows 
 
Gary C. Biddle*, Mary L. Z. Ma**, Frank M. Song* 
 
*Faculty of Business and Economics 
University of Hong Kong 
 
**Institute for Financial Accounting Studies 
Xiamen University 
 
May 20, 2012 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines whether unconditional and conditional accounting conservatism (UC and 
CC) serve risk management roles with respect to the downside properties of operating cash flows 
(OCF), and channels by which they operate. Our results reveal both UC and CC to be negatively 
associated with OCF downside risk measured by indicators of OCF falling below its 
expectations, OCF relative lower partial moments and OCF at risk. Tests of operative channels 
indicate that (1) UC and CC relate positively to cash holdings that reduce OCF downside risk 
and that (2) UC (CC) substitutes for (complements) corporate hedging in helping mitigate OCF 
downside risk. Further tests indicate that downside cash flow beta enhances the mitigating 
effects of UC and CC on OCF downside risk. These findings are robust to alternative measures 
and controls and lend support to accounting conservatism playing a risk management role with 
respect to OCF downside risk. 
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The Risk Management Role of Accounting Conservatism  
for Operating Cash Flows 
 
1. Introduction 
Operating cash flow insufficiency and negative cash flow shocks are downside risks of 
primary concern to shareholders, debtholders, managers and other firm stakeholders. This study 
explicitly examines whether unconditional and conditional accounting conservatism (UC and CC) 
help mitigate operating cash flow (OCF) downside risk and their operative channels via two real 
risk management instruments – cash holdings and corporate hedging. Our results reveal both UC 
and CC to be negatively associated with subsequent OCF downside risk measured by indicators 
of OCF falling below expectations, OCF relative root lower partial moments (RRLPM) and OCF 
at risk, with cash flow beta a conditioning variable. Tests of operative channels reveal both UC 
and CC to complement cash holdings in mitigating OCF downside risk. UC (CC) is found to 
substitute for (complement) corporate hedging in mitigating OCF downside risk. This study is 
the first to provide direct evidence on the risk management role of accounting conservatism and 
on the joint use of accounting conservatism, cash holdings, and hedging in managing cash flow 
downside risk. 
Accounting conservatism is defined as “a prudent reaction to risk and uncertainty to ensure 
that uncertainty and risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered,” (Statement 
of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 (FASB 1980, p. 10)). Although this definition connotes 
a risk mitigation role, no prior study has explicitly examined relations between conservatism and 
OCF downside risk from a risk management perspective, with evidence regarding their potential 
relations limited though suggestive. For example, Francis and Martin (2010) and Luo and Watts 
(2011) argue that conservatism improves acquisition profitability by enhancing the monitoring 
of investments and helps alleviate capital underinvestment during financial crises by enhancing 
firms' borrowing capacity, respectively. This evidence suggests that conservatism holds the 
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potential to mitigate OCF downside risk by improving capital investment efficiency. In contrast, 
Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan (2009) argue that conservatism induces covenant 
violations that may trigger inefficient liquidations of positive net present value projects, thus causing 
underinvestment and OCF shortfalls. Gao and Liang (2011) similarly argue that by weakening 
stock price information feedback, higher financial reporting quality (including conservative 
reporting) impedes investment efficiency and resource allocations, implying higher OCF 
downside risk. Therefore, it remains an open empirical question as to whether and how 
accounting conservatism plays a risk management role relevant to OCF downside risk. 
Associations between accounting conservatism and OCF downside risk are of interest to 
investors, who have been documented previously to be loss-averse and attentive to downside risk 
(e.g., Roy 1952; Menezes, Geiss, and Tressler 1980; Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Koonce 
McAnally, and Mercer 2005a). In particular, Koonce et al. (2005a) find that investors place 
greater weight on loss probabilities and outcomes than on gains. Dutta and Radner (1999) argue 
that a top shareholder priority is to minimize downside risk to enhance firms' survival potentials; 
Minton and Schrand (1999) and Zhang (2008) argue that debtholder priories are to lower OCF 
risk and default risk that are major determinants of risk premia charged to borrowers. Risk 
management theories further argue that firms have incentives to hedge against negative cash 
flow shocks (Smith and Stulz 1985; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993) using instruments that 
include cash holdings, operating hedging, corporate hedging and lines of credit. Except for cash 
holdings, these instruments incur explicit costs and require business and financial expertise to 
execute (Disatnik, Duchin, and Schmidt 2012). In contrast, Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) argue 
that accounting-based risk management (e.g., earnings smoothing) involves less cost and 
expertise. If conservatism mitigates OCF downside risk, it would provide a low-cost risk 
management tool for managing OCF downside risk. 
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Examining the risk management role of accounting conservatism also is of relevance to the 
ongoing debates regarding the benefits, costs and continuing role of accounting conservatism as 
a central tenet of financial accounting. The Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) and 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) removed conservatism from their Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 in 2010 on the reasoning that it conflicts with neutrality. If 
this conceptual correspondence has the effect of reducing OCF downside risk, a reconsideration 
of conservatism’s continuing role in financial accounting may be warranted. 
UC and CC are predicted to directly mitigate OCF downside risk by enhancing investor 
monitoring, constraining earnings management, and by generating contracting benefits. By 
conveying to investors and other stakeholders timely information regarding firm performance 
and risk, UC and CC enhance the monitoring of firms' operations and risk management activities 
that reduce operational shocks (Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari 2008). 
This enhanced monitoring incentivizes managers with performance-based compensation to take 
attendant risk reducing actions (Francis and Xumin 2011). Accounting conservatism also 
discourages earnings overstatements and enhances the verifiability of accounting information 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Gao 2011; Hui, Klasa, and Yeung 2012), thus enhancing the 
credibility of firms' financial reports and lowering bankruptcy risk (Biddle, Ma, and Song (BMS) 
2012). This facilitates more favorable contracting terms (e.g., lower interest rates in debt 
contracting) and more stable trading relationships (e.g., longer-term sales contracts), thus 
helping alleviate underinvestment and reducing related negative OCF shocks and shortfalls. 
Of equal interest is whether UC and CC influence OCF downside risk indirectly via risk 
mitigation instruments previously identified and how exogenous conditions influence relations 
between conservatism and OCF downside risk. In this study we examine two long-documented 
“real” risk management instruments, cash holdings and corporate hedging, as possible channels 
by which conservatism may influence OCF downside risk. Specifically, we hypothesize that 
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both UC and CC reduce OCF downside risk via increasing cash holdings. In essence, these 
predictions follow from the reasoning that conservatism promotes precautionary cash savings as 
OCF uncertainty rises (Kirschenheiter and Ramakrishnan 2010) and increases cash from debt 
financings (Luo and Watts 2011). With more cash saved and borrowed, firms can better maintain 
operations and pursue growth opportunities, thus mitigating OCF negative shocks and shortfalls. 
We further hypothesize that UC (CC) will substitute for (complement) corporate hedging that 
has been found in prior studies to reduce OCF downside risk (Stulz 1996; Rawls and Smithson 
1993). These predictions follow from the reasoning that UC is for many firms a commitment that 
pre-dates hedging whereas CC is conditional timely bad news reporting that would coincide with 
or post-date new bad-news-motivated hedging. As explained below, examining these indirect 
relations between accounting conservatism and OCF downside risk also holds the design 
advantage of controlling for a possible mechanical relation between conservatism and OCF 
downside risk arising from previously documented negative relations between accounting 
accruals and OCF (Basu 1997; Dechow 1994; Dechow, Kothari, and Watts 1998; Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005, 2006).1 
Finally, we examine the exogenous influence on these relations of downside cash flow 
beta.2 Our consideration of downside cash flow beta as an exogenous influence derives from 
prior findings that conservatism enhances borrowing ability during economic downturns (Luo 
and Watts 2011), which would thus reduce its potential to mitigate OCF downside risk. 
To test these propositions and ensure robustness, we examine three OCF downside risk 
measures. Extending Stone (1973), Fishburn (1977) and Stein, Usher, LaGattuta, and Youngen 
(2001), OCF downside risk is measured by indicators for OCF dropping below its expectation, 
                                                
1 In brief, higher OCF increases negative accruals and accrual-based conservatism, and decreases negative OCF shocks and OCF 
downside risk, which can give rise to a potential negative mechanical relation between conservatism and OCF downside risk. 
Tests documenting indirect influences of accounting conservatism on OCF downside risk via other risk mitigation instruments do 
not reflect this effect. 
2 Disatnik et al. (2012) report that firms jointly use derivatives, cash holdings, and  lines of credit to manage cash flow risk and 
that cash holdings are negatively associated derivative hedging. 
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OCF RRLPM and OCF at risk (see Appendices A and B for details). For all three measures, 
R&D and advertising expenses are added back to OCF to ensure that OCF downside risk reflects 
OCF shortfalls and insufficiency rather than the influences of growth potentials. Following BMS 
(2012), we measure UC using four measures: total accruals, the ranking of industry-adjusted 
book-to-market ratio, hidden reserves, and by a factor score from a principal components 
analysis (PCA) of these three measures. Extending BMS (2012), we similarly measure CC by 
four measures: accumulated non-operational accruals, an accrual-based AR ratio, an accrual-
based CR ratio, and by a factor score from a PCA of these measures, where AR and CR ratios are 
adapted to exclude the confounding effects asymmetric timeliness of OCF following Tian, 
Collins, and Hribar (2009). 
Our sample is comprised of 30,337 U.S. firm-year observations with available data for the 
OCF downside risk and conservatism measures for fiscal years 1992-2007. We employ logit 
models and Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression models to test the direct effects 
of UC and CC on OCF downside risk. Three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression models are 
used to examine the cash holdings channel and downside cash flow beta condition, together with 
an extended three-stage Heckman (1979) model for the hedging channel. These specifications 
control for endogeneity caused by reverse causality and common governance, risk and industry 
shocks. 
Our empirical results indicate that both UC and CC directly mitigate subsequent OCF 
downside risk as hypothesized. Further analyses of channels and conditions indicate that (1) both 
UC and CC help enhance cash holdings that mitigate OCF downside risk; (2) UC (CC) 
substitutes for (complements) corporate hedging in mitigating OCF downside risk; (3) downside 
cash flow beta enhances the mitigating effects of UC and CC on OCF downside risk. As 
robustness checks, we examine whether our results are sensitive to alternate OCF expectation 
models, alternate deflators of OCF RRLPM and alternative conservatism measures, with 
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qualitatively similar findings. We also consider the effects of monitoring by institutional 
shareholders, boards of directors and creditors, earnings smoothing, and alternate regression 
specifications, with results qualitatively unchanged. Altogether, our findings lend support to 
accounting conservatism serving a risk management role for OCF downside risk. 
This study’s findings contribute to several academic literatures. First, they extend the 
accounting conservatism literature by documenting associations between conservatism and OCF 
downside risk. Combining risk management theories and conservatism theory, this study 
contributes insights regarding the risk management role of accounting conservatism and 
provides initial evidence that UC and CC directly mitigate OCF downside risk. Our findings 
further document two specific channels (cash holdings and hedging) and an economic condition 
(downside cash flow beta) for the observed relations, which further illuminate the risk 
management role of accounting conservatism. In this context of the conservatism literature, these 
results both help to explain conservatism’s longstanding use and standing as a tenant of financial 
accounting and will help inform deliberations determining its future. 
Second, our findings are relevant to the risk management literature. In particular, Disatnik 
et al. (2012) investigate associations between derivative hedging, cash holdings, and lines of 
credit to manage cash flow risks while Gamba and Triantis (2011) analytically examine the joint 
usage of derivative hedging, cash holdings, and operational hedging. Barton (2001) and Pincus 
and Rajgopal (2002) focus on relations between accrual smoothing and derivative hedging. 
Complementing these studies, this study documents that both UC and CC complement cash 
holdings and that UC (CC) substitutes for (complements) derivative hedging in mitigating OCF 
downside risk, thus establishing conservatism as an accounting-based instrument that firms can 
employ in concert with other risk management tools. Our findings further contribute to this 
literature by documenting that hedging decreases whereas earnings smoothing increases OCF 
downside risk. 
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Third, this study extends the downside risk literature by introducing three accounting-
based OCF downside risk measures within the RRLPM and VaR frameworks that retain R&D 
expenditures to better distinguish OCF shortfalls from growth effects and better control for OFC 
asymmetry that may influence prior measures including OCF volatility (Dechow et al. 1998; Luo, 
Ma, Wu 2012). This study also extends a growing literature relating accounting information 
quality and economic recessions (Balakrishnan 2009; Luo and Watts 2011; Beatty and Liao 
2011). Balakrishnan (2009) argues that lower financial reporting quality magnifies and prolongs 
the negative consequences of economic downturns. Luo and Watts (2011) find conservatism to 
be associated with increased firm value during the 2008-2009 financial crisis consistent with 
enhanced borrowing capability and reduced under-investments; Beatty and Liao (2011) provide 
complementary evidence that conditional conservatism asymmetrically increases bank lending 
during economic recessions. Complementing these studies, this study provides evidence that the 
risk management effects of UC and CC strengthen during economic downturns. 
Lastly, our findings have practical implications for economic policy-making and 
accounting standard-setting suggesting conservatism as a relatively low-cost accounting-based 
risk management tool that is especially effective during economic downturns when exogenous 
economic shocks are severe. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses, 
Section 3 describes research methodologies, Section 4 reports empirical results and Section 5 
concludes. Appendices A and B describe models used to estimate OCF downside risk. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
2.1 The Risk Management Role of Accounting Conservatism 
Investors care about OCF downside risk. Beyond studies cited above documenting 
shareholders’ and creditors' differing priorities for downside losses versus upside gains, Stulz 
(1996) argues explicitly that the purpose of risk management is to mitigate OCF downside 
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volatility rather than overall volatility. Smith and Stulz (1985) and Froot et al. (1993) concur 
analytically that firms use derivative hedging to manage negative cash flow shocks and to 
minimize future financing and distress costs. Therefore, investors have natural incentives to 
monitor managers' operating decisions, investments and risk management activities to assure 
that firms survive negative OCF shocks.  Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston (1998) report that investors 
are concerned about firms' hedging usage, and Koonce et al. (2005a, b) document that investors 
use accounting information to monitor managers' risk management activities. 
Accounting conservatism has been argued to enhance investors' monitoring of firms’ 
operations, investment, and risk management activities via the timely reporting of lower-tail 
realizations of earnings and assets (Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Ball et al. 2008).3  In turn, 
enhanced investor monitoring and feedbacks to managers incentivizes those with incentive 
compensation and concerns about career advancement to implement investment and risk 
management strategies that curtail OCF downside realizations. For example, timely loss 
recognitions and risk revelations stimulate the disciplining of under-performing managers in 
well-governed firms, thus motivating them to enhance operating efficiency, curb capital over-
investment and forego unprofitable acquisitions (Francis and Martin 2010). Conservatism also 
facilitates timely interventions and monitoring by debtholders after firms violate debt covenants, 
with the economic effect of improving investment and financial efficiency (Tan 2011). In both 
cases, heightened investment efficiency reduces negative OCF shocks and cash flow shortfalls. 
Despite a scarcity of evidence, timely risk information reporting via conservatism can likewise 
enhance the efficiency of risk management activities that ameliorate OCF shortfalls and mitigate 
negative OCF shocks. 
                                                
3 There is disagreement on this point in the literature. Gigler et al. (2009) argue that conservatism exercises less verification over 
bad earnings news and reports income-decreasing events on cost of downwardly biased estimation, thus reducing its information 
contents. Nevertheless, Gao (2011) demonstrates that in presence of managerial opportunism (e.g. earnings management), 
conservatism's role in counterbalancing earnings management rectifies for this downward bias, and thus conservatism still 
provides useful information that enhances monitoring. 
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By understating earnings and net assets, accounting conservatism also directly reduces 
OCF downside risk by retaining more OCF within firms contracting with varied stakeholders 
and counterparties (managers and employees, revenue agencies, suppliers and customers, etc.). 
Firms' contracting terms are often based on accounting numbers.  Lowering reported earnings 
and assets can thus lessen payouts to contracting parties even without changing contract terms in 
the presence of sufficient opacity, for example, for compensation (Watts 2003), interest (Ahmed, 
Billings, Morton, and Stanford-Harris 2002; Wittenberg-Moerman 2008), and taxes (Biddle 
1980). These reduced cash outflows directly reduce OCF insufficiency and shortfalls, thereby 
diminishing OCF downside risk. 
Conservatism has further been argued to constrain earnings overstatements and enhance 
the verifiability of accounting information (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Gao 2011; Hui et al. 
2012). This in turn enhances suppliers', customers', and other contracting parties' beliefs in the 
credibility of managers and firms' financial reporting, thus helping firms to win more favorable 
contracting and credit terms and longer-term contracts. These earnings management and 
contracting benefits of conservatism endow UC and CC with the potential to help mitigate 
negative cash flow shocks and minimize financing and distress costs. For example, if UC and 
CC mitigate customers' business risk by reducing earnings management and bankruptcy risk 
(BMS 2012), this increases firms' bargaining power and enhances long-term relations, thus 
reducing negative shocks from customers and product markets to firms' operations and OCF. In 
addition, UC and CC have been argued to reduce interest rates and enhance the availability of 
external financing for investments (Ahmed et al. 2002; Zhang 2008). Conservatism also tightens 
the wedge between internal and external costs of funds, thus relieving financial constraints and 
enabling firms to undertake more “marginal” investment projects (Luo and Watts 2012). 
Collectively, these prior findings and inferences regarding the monitoring, managerial 
incentives, earnings management, and contracting effects for accounting conservatism suggest 
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that both UC and CC should directly reduce OCF downside risk as reflected in hypothesis H1: 
H1: Unconditional and conditional conservatism directly reduce OCF downside risk. 
2.2 Cash Holdings, Corporate Hedging, and the Risk Management Role of Accounting 
Conservatism 
Cash Holdings and the Risk Management Role of Accounting Conservatism 
 We predict that UC and CC will reduce OCF downside risk indirectly by enhancing cash 
holdings, a well-recognized “real” risk management instrument. Accounting conservatism 
enhances cash holdings from external and internal sources, especially when under-investment 
and/or financial constraints are severe. Accounting conservatism enhances cash holdings from 
external financing by reducing interest expenses and boosting firms' borrowing capabilities, 
especially during economic downturns (Luo and Watts 2011). Conservatism also motivates 
precautionary cash savings when firms' future cash flows are risky (Kirschenheiter and 
Ramakrishnan 2010). Moreover, as suggested by risk management theories (Froot et al. 1993; 
Stulz 1996; Acharya et al. 2007), conservatism reduces the correlation between reported OCF 
and growth opportunities among growth firms by signaling OCF downside risk in a timely 
fashion, thus creating cash conservation incentives that alleviate under-investment and lessen 
financial constraints. With sufficient cash from internal and external sources, firms can better 
support their operations and attenuate under-investment, thus decreasing the probability of 
negative OCF realizations and OCF shortfalls. Corroborating this argument, Lins, Servaes, and 
Tufano (2010) document that firms hold excess cash mainly as a buffer against future cash 
shortfalls. Whereas larger cash holdings may exacerbate free cash flow related agency problems, 
such as cash wastage in firm operations and investments (Jensen 1986; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, 
and Williamson 1999), thus leading to OCF shortfalls, this effect is ameliorated by findings that 
conservatism mitigates agency problems associated with increased cash holdings (Louis, Sun, 
and Urcan 2012). Combined, the above reasoning suggests that both UC and CC will reduce 
OCF downside risk by increasing cash holdings, as reflected in hypothesis H2: 
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H2: Unconditional and conditional conservatism indirectly reduce OCF downside risk via the 
cash holdings channel. 
Corporate Hedging and the Risk Management Role of Accounting Conservatism 
A second real risk management instrument examined in this study is corporate hedging. 
Specifically, we predict that UC and CC indirectly affect OCF downside risk by complementing 
or substituting for corporate hedging. Previous studies suggest that corporate hedging mitigates 
OCF downside risk; for instance, Smith and Stulz (1985) show analytically that hedging reduces 
bankruptcy risk by increasing income on the downside. Stulz (1996) further argues that the goal 
of corporate risk management is to eliminate lower-tail outcomes. Rawls and Smithson (1993) 
concur that chief financial officers selectively eliminate OCF downside risk rather than total 
risk.4 Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) document that hedging reduces borrowing costs and 
relaxes debt covenants restricting investment, which hold the potential to reduce future OCF 
shortfalls. 
Conservatism influences OCF downside risk by complementing or substituting for 
corporate hedging in several ways. On one hand, as noted, timely risk and loss revelations 
facilitate the ex post monitoring managers’ risk mitigation activities by external stakeholders 
such as shareholders, debtholders, independent directors, auditors and regulators, which in turn 
incentivizes managers to initiate hedging for OCF negative shocks. This suggests a 
complementary relationship between conservatism and hedging. On the other hand, 
conservatism mitigates OCF shortfalls, predates and preempts hedging, and enhances cash 
holdings that substitute for hedging as documented by Disatnik et al. (2012). Thus, managers 
and other stakeholders may strategically employ low-cost accounting conservatism rather than 
more costly hedging instruments to mitigate OCF downside risk (Koonce et al. 2005a).5 
                                                
4 Some hedging instruments limit both OCF downside risk and upside potential. For example, a collar is an option that confines 
the range of possible positive or negative returns on an underlying indicator. Hedging instruments are often designed to decrease 
varied specific risk exposures which are ultimately reflected in OCF downside risk. 
5 Consistent with Disatnik et al. (2012), Knooce et al. (2005a) report that investors consider derivatives to be riskier than non-
derivative financial instruments even when the underlying economic exposure is held constant. 
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The reasoning suggests that relations between UC and CC and hedging may differ. In 
particular, UC is a major contributor to conservatism, is employed consistently over long periods, 
and is not bad news driven (Ryan 2006).  Hence, UC is likely to predate and preempt arising 
hedging opportunities and dampen new hedging usage, especially productive hedging, and it 
enhances cash holdings that substitute for hedging. Hence, UC is more likely to serve as a cost-
effective substitute for new effective hedging. In contrast, CC is a smaller contributor to 
conservatism (Ryan 2006) and occurs sporadically.  Hence, it precludes precautionary hedging 
to a lesser degree. Further, CC arises unexpectedly, conditional on bad news realizations, and 
conveys bad news in a timely manner regarding arising risk exposures, which helps motivate 
new hedging programs, encourage productive hedging and deter ineffective and speculative 
hedging. Thus, CC is more likely to serve as a cost-effective complement to new effective 
corporate hedging programs that reduce negative OCF shocks. Altogether, this reasoning implies 
that UC (CC) should substitute for (complement) corporate hedging and hedging effectiveness in 
mitigating OCF downside risk as reflected in hypothesis H3: 
H3: Unconditional (conditional) conservatism substitutes for (complements) hedging usage and 
hedging effectiveness in mitigating OCF downside risk. 
2.3 Conjectures Regarding Downside Cash Flow Variance 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggest that in the presence of costly frictions during 
economic downturns, the effect of conservatism on OCF downside risk should be more salient. 
Economic downturns, especially financial crises, represent exogenous negative shocks that 
significantly weaken firms’ funding ability and deteriorate under-investment problems. However, 
firms with higher conservatism possess enhanced borrowing capability (Luo and Watts 2011), so 
they can better maintain normal operations during economic downturns and survive OCF 
shortfalls. Moreover, during economic downturns when firms face more pressure to cut product 
prices to survive, greater conservatism exposes trading partners to lower bankruptcy risk (BMS 
2012), which aids customer retention, thus reducing negative cash flow shocks. Negative 
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economic shocks influence firm-level OCF downside risk via downside cash flow covariance. 
The above reasoning regarding the effects of negative economic shocks on firm-level OCF 
downside risk suggests that conditioning by downside cash flow covariance will enhance the 
mitigating effects of UC and CC on OCF downside risk. 
3. Data, Measures and Estimation Models 
3.1 Data 
We examine a sample of 30,337 firm-year observations with available data listed on NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ exchanges for fiscal years 1992 through 2007.6 Following Stein et al. 
(2001), we omit firm-year observations in the lower 5% of the total asset distribution to mitigate 
the small denominator bias and delete industry-years with fewer than twenty observations to 
more accurately estimate OCF benchmark models. We require at least five years of continual 
data for calculating OCF downside risk, which induces a survival bias of some degree. We 
winsorize all variables at the top and bottom 1% of their distributions and exclude firms in the 
financial and utilities industries (firms with SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999 respectively). 
To test the hedging channel, we hand-collect new hedging usage data for 445 hedging firms 
from 10-K annual reports in the Edgar-Online database for fiscal years 1995 to 2007.7 Following 
Zhang (2009) and Guay (1999), we focus on new hedging programs because the inherent 
business risk for firms with derivative positions is unobservable and thus renders it impossible to 
explain longitudinal results. Data for CEO incentives are obtained from ExecuComp. 
3.2 OCF Downside Risk Measures 
The traditional focus of risk management is OCF volatility rather than earnings volatility as 
it reflects the effects of risk-management activities on firms’ real operations (Smith and Stulz 
                                                
6 This period is chosen to avoid possible bias caused by the financial crisis that can qualitatively change hypothesized relations 
and to enhance the availability of cash flow statement data. FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 95 
required firms to report cash flow statements for fiscal years ending after 15 July 1988; Lorek and Willinger (1996) and Hribar 
and Collins (2002) document measurement errors in cash flow estimates based on prior data. Because the OCF measures used in 
this study require lagged observations, 1989 data allows us to measure OCF beginning in 1992. 
7 The 10-K annual reports of U.S. listed firms in the Edgar-Online database are available for fiscal years 1994 to 2007. 
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1985; Froot et al. 1993; Zhang 2009).8 Moreover, the current downside properties of OFC are of 
most interest to investors as documented above (Stulz 1996 and Koonce et al. 2005a) rather than 
earnings downside risk that more reflects future OCF downside risk. Detailed below are the 
three measures used in this study for current OCF downside risk: DOCF, which is an indicator 
that OCF drops below its expected level; Rlpm_OCF, the RRLPM of OCF, and CFaR, OCF at-
risk. 
OCF Downside Risk Measures within the RRLPM Framework 
OCF downside risk measures DOCF and Rlpm_OCF belong to the RRLPM framework 
developed based on the lower partial moment (LPM) concept. LPM includes only the downside 
distribution of a variable relative to a reference level in moment calculation (Stone 1973; 
Fishburn 1977). For OCF with possible value realization γ, the continuous case of LPM of OCF 
for a given firm i, LPMα(τ:i), is expressed by the following cumulative distribution function:  
( )LPM : ( ) , 0i i ii f d
τ α
α τ τ γ γ γ α−∞= − ≥∫  (1), 
where τ is the OCF target level, and f(γi) is the probability density function for firm i’s OCF. α is 
a moment indicator that reflects the relative importance of the magnitude that OCF deviates 
below its target level. For α = 0, the magnitude does not matter and LPMα(τ:i) collapses to an 
indicator of below-target OCF. For α = 1 and α = 2, LPMα(τ:i) is consistent with below-target 
shortfall and semi-variance, but not with a mere shortfall and semi-variance since even for 
symmetric distributions, if the target OCF τ deviates from the sample mean, OCF LPM will still 
differ from OCF shortfalls and semi-variance. The discrete case for OCF LPM for a given firm i 
when α = 2 is expressed as:  
( ) 22
1LPM : ( )
i
ii N
τ
γ τ
τ τ γ
<
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑         (2), 
where N is the number of observations in the sample. Root lower partial moment RLPM is the 
                                                
8 In addition, changes in earnings volatility also capture effects of accounting treatments (Zhang 2009), which by construction 
introduces mechanical relations between conservatism and its risk management consequence on OCF downside risk. 
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root of LPM and is linearly homogeneous of degree one such that changes in τ and in LPM are 
proportional. The discretionary case of OCF RLPM for firm i when α=2 is expressed as: 
( ) ( )
1/2
1/2 2
2 2
1RLPM : LPM : ( )
i
ii i N
τ
γ τ
τ τ τ γ
<
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= = −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑  (3), 
Following the spirit of RLPM, we also estimate a root upper partial moment of OCF 
RUPM that captures OCF upside potentials and the probability that OCF deviates above its 
expected level. To the extent that higher RUPM usually accompanies higher RLPM, we 
construct RRLPM, a relative RLPM measure that deflates RLPM by RUPM to control for firm-
level differences in upside potentials and thus better compares OCF downside risk across firms. 
Applying an logarithm transformation we get the following RRLPM of OCF definition: 
RRLPM of OCF Rlpm_OCF. Rlpm_OCF refers to the ranked natural logarithm of the 
ratio of one plus the OCF RLPM over one plus the OCF RUPM, with both RLPM and RUPM 
estimated over a three-year horizon covering the current and previous two years: 
Rlpm_OCFit  = log[(1 + RLPM2(OCFit) / (1 + RUPM2(OCFit)]    (4), 
where RLPM2(OCFit) = [(1/3)Σ((έit*Iέit≤0)2]1/2, and RUPM2(OCFit) = [(1/3)Σ((έit*Iέit≥0))2]1/2, 
representing the OCF RLPM and RUPM respectively. Iέit≤0 is an indicator that equals one if έit<0 
and zero otherwise, wherein έit is the residual from an OCF expectation model as shown below: 
OCFit = β0 + β1OCFit-1 + β2OCFit-2 + β3OCFit-3 + β4SALEit-1 + β5SIZEit-1                        (5), 
       + β6LEVERAGEit-1 + β7STD_OCFit-1 + Year_Dummies + εit 
where OCF is the ratio of annual OCF to total assets. Concurrently expensed R&D and adverting 
expenditures are added back to OCF so that Rlpm_OCF as calculated is free of the effects of 
growth potentials and reflects only OCF shortfalls. Model (5) incorporates OCF level and 
volatility (Minton, Schrand, and Walther 2002) along with other economic determinants of OCF 
such as firms size, sales (Dechow 1994; Dechow et al. 1998), and leverage. The rationale for 
these determinants and other model details is described in Appendix A. 
We define the special case for RRLPM of OCF with zero moment (α = 0) as below: 
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Indicator of OCF Deviating below Expectation DOCF. DOCF is a dummy variable indicating 
that OCF falls below its expected level, and is equal to one when the residual from equation (5) 
έit < 0, and zero otherwise. 
OCF Downside Risk Measures within the VaR Framework 
OCF at Risk CFaR. CFaR falls within the value at-risk (VaR) framework and refers to the 
ranked ratio of the worst case of quarterly OCF at a 1% confidence level estimated from its 
probability distribution to the expected OCF estimated from a quarterly estimation model: 9 
OCFQt  = β0 + β1OCFQt-1 + β2OCFQt-2 + β3OCFQt-3 + β4OCFQt-4 + β5OCFQt-5       (6) 
 + γ1Q1 + γ2Q2+ γ3Q3 + εt   
where OCFQ is the ratio of quarterly OCF to total assets, with quarterly OCF adjusted for R&D 
and adverting expenditures to ensure that the estimated CFaR is free from the effects of related 
growth potentials and hence only captures OCF insufficiency. Extending Stein et al. (2001), we 
employ a comparables approach to calculate CFaR over a rolling window of seventeen fiscal 
quarters with estimation details in Appendix B.10 
Comparing the OCF downside risk measures, DOCF is a dummy variable, simplest but 
insensitive to the magnitude of OCF downside risk; CFaR considers only the extreme loss case 
and is most appropriate for crisis analyses; Rlpm_OCF considers all loss levels but is 
computationally more complex. 
3.3 Accounting Conservatism Measures 
Following BMS (2012), this study considers four UC measures: UC_ACC (total accrual 
adapted from Ahmed et al. 2002), UC_BM (the ranked industry-adjusted BM ratio), UC_RES 
hidden reserve (Penman and Zhang 2002), and UC_PCA, a factor score generated from a PCA 
of the above three UC measures and is used as the primary UC measure. Extending BMS (2012), 
                                                
9 CFaR is similar to VaR, the potential loss in value of a risky asset or portfolio over a defined period for a given confidence 
interval. However, unlike VaR, CFaR focuses on the overall OCF effects of all types of risk exposures rather than on the value 
effect of only risk exposures of specific financial assets. 
10 The comparables approach is a nonparametric method that sorts firms with similar risk features into pools of comparable peer 
firm-quarters to construct large samples of negative OCF shocks. Compared with the technique using only one company's data, 
the comparables approach uses data of both a firm and its comparables and facilitates estimating over tail probabilities. 
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this study similarly employs four CC measures: CC_ACM (accumulated non-operating accruals), 
CC_ARA (an extension of CC_AR in BMS 2012), CC_CRA (an extension of the CC_CR in BMS 
2012), and CC_PCA, a factor score generated from a PCA of the above three CC measures and 
is used as the primary UC measure. CC_ARA and CC_CRA exclude asymmetric OCF timeliness 
from CC_AR and CC_CR, respectively, because it is irrelevant to conservatism and overstates 
the Basu- and other market-based CC measures (Tian et al. 2009).11 
CC_ARA. CC_ARA is the ranked ratio of the sum of the C Score and the G Score to the G 
Score estimated from an extended Khan and Watts (2009) model that replaces earnings with 
accruals to retain only asymmetric accrual timeliness.12 
CC_CRA. CC_CRA is the ranked ratio of current accrual shocks to total accrual news 
multiplied by -1 for good accrual news. It extends the CC_CR in BMS (2012) by focusing on 
only the asymmetric timeliness of bad relative to good accrual news.13 
                                                
11 In particular, asymmetric OCF timeliness could otherwise inflate CC_AR and CC_CR and increase OCF downside risk at the 
same time, leading to a spurious positive relation between CC_AR and CC_CR and OCF downside risk, which weakens the 
testing power of our empirical analysis for the hypothesized negative relation between them. Therefore, it is important to net out 
asymmetric cash flow timeliness from both CC_AR and CC_CR. 
12  We estimate  the following model for fiscal years 1990 to 2007: 
ACCit= b1 + b2DRit + Rit*(m1 + m2Sizeit + m3M/Bit + m4LEVit) + DRit*Rit (l1 + l2Sizeit + l3M/Bit + l4LEVit)  
Then GScore_ACCit = m1 + m2Sizeit + m3M/Bit + m4 LEVit =  -1.89539 + Sizeit*0.5239 - M/Bit*0.0367- LEVit *1.7393 
      C_Score_ACCit= l1 + l2Sizeit + l3M/Bit + l4LEVit  =3.3696 - Size*0.9200 + M/Bit*0.0456 + LEVit*2.75340 
where the CScore_ACC (GScore_ACC) score refers to C (G) score that measures the timeliness of bad (good) accruals news.  
13 Specifically, we  replace earnings with accruals (acc) and OCF (cf) in the return decomposition model: 
rt - Et-1(rt )= ΔEt +ΔEt∑
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3.5 Estimation Methodology and Models 
3.5.1  Direct Effects of UC and CC on OCF Downside Risk 
This study uses the following model (7) to test H1 regarding the direct effects of UC and 
CC on subsequent OCF downside risk, with H1 predicting γ1 < 0: 
DR_OCFit = γ0 + γ1CONit-1 + Controlsit + εit (7) 
where DR_OCF refers to DOCF, Rlpm_OCF or CFaR, and CON refers to UC proxies UC_PCA, 
UC_ACC, UC_BM, UC_RES, and CC metrics CC_PCA, CC_ACM, CC_ARA and CC_CRA. 
Model (7) takes the form of logit model with DOCF as dependent variable and Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) model with Rlpm_OCF or CFaR as dependent variable. The control variables 
Controlsit include previously identified determinants of OCF downside risk.14 
3.5.2  Three-stage Least Square (3SLS) Model for Cash Holdings Channel 
We employ the following 3SLS model to test H2 regarding the cash holdings channel. The 
first-stage OLS model (equation (8)) regresses UC and CC on cash holdings, their common risk, 
governance and industry determinants, to control for endogeneity between UC and CC and cash 
holdings caused by their reverse causality, plus common risk, governance, industry and sector 
factors. The second-stage (equation (9)) OLS model regresses cash holdings on the residuals of 
UC and CC estimated from the first-stage, UC_R and CC_R, and other determinants of cash 
holdings.15 The third-stage OLS model (equation (10)) regress future OCF downside risk 
DR_OCF against residuals of cash holdings from the second-stage CH_R and other determinants 
                                                
14 In particular, these control variables include cash holdings CASH, change in cash holdings ΔCASH, capital investment 
intensity Invest_Capx, R&D investment intensity Invest_RD, organizational slack SLACK, human resource slack SLACK_EMP, 
firm size SIZE, return on total assets ROA, financial leverage Leverage, operating options OO, past return volatility Sigma, CEO 
effort-taking incentives CEO_Delta and CEO risk-taking incentives CEO_Vega. There is no consensus regarding the sources of 
OCF downside risk in the literature. Zhang (2009) suggests that the determinants of OCF volatility include the intensity of the 
plant, property, plant and equipment (PPE hereafter) (-), firm size (-), growth opportunities (+), leverage (+), return volatility (+), 
CEO risk-aversion incentives (-) and CEO risk-taking incentives (+). Similarly, Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006) document that firms 
with high ROEs, small firm size, high asset-growth, low book-to-market ratio, high return volatility, high past downside betas 
and past winners have a high downside beta (Dbeta). Other studies show that past organizational slackness (Miller and Reuler 
1996) and operating options proxied by capitalized PPE assets (Driouchi and Bennett 2010) reduce downside risk. Dummies for 
Fama and French (1997) industry classifications Ind and for fiscal years Year are included to capture fixed industry and year 
effects, respectively. 
15 Controls1 in equation (9) include ΔCash, Dissue, DIV, Leverage, Loss, NWC, OO, ROA, Sigma, Size, Slack, Slack_emp, 
CEO_Delta and CEO_Vega, and year and industry dummies, which are common determinants of cash holdings documented in 
the literature (Bates, Kathleen, and Stulz 2009; Opler et al. 1999). Controls2 in equation (10) are the same as control variables 
used in Model (7). 
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of Rlpm_OCF.  
CONit = α0 + α1CONit-1 + α2Cashit-1 + α3ROA it-1 + α4 Sizeit-1 (8)  
    + α5Leverageit-1 + ΣbmIndm + ΣbnYearn + υit-1 
CHit  = b0 + b1 UC_PCA_Rit-1 + b2 CC_PCA_Rit-1 + Controls1it + εit, (9) 
Rlpm_OCFit  = γ0 + γ1Ch_Rit-1*UC_PCA_Rit-1 + γ2Ch_Rit-1*CC_PCA_Rit-1 (10)  
+ γ3UC_PCA_Rit-1 + γ4CC_PCA_Rit-1 + γ5CH_Rit-1 + Controls2it-1 + µit 
where CON = UC_PCA or CC_PCA, and CH = Cash. H2 predicts b1, b2 > 0 and γ5 < 0 for the 
effects of both UC and CC via the cash holdings channel. Following Baron and Kenny (1986), 
the mediating effect of the cash holdings channel refers to its effect on OCF downside risk as 
stimulated by UC and CC, and it is equal to the product of β1 and γ2. 
3.5.3  Extended Heckman (1979) Model for the Hedging Channel 
We use the extended three-stage Heckman (1979) model below to test H3 regarding the 
hedging channel, augmenting the classical Heckman model by: (1) adding a one-stage OLS 
regression (equation (11)) ahead of the previous first-stage probit model to control for 
endogeniety between conservatism and hedging due to their reverse causality and common risk, 
governance, industry and sector factors; (2) employing a difference-in-differences specification 
in the last stage OLS regression (equation (13)) because examining only firms that initiate 
hedging programs (treatment firms) could yield biased results when there are other changes 
coincident to the initiation of new hedging programs.16 Specifically, equation (11) regresses both 
UC_PCA and CC_PCA on the hedging indicator, risk and governance factors common to both 
conservatism and hedging. Equation (12) is a probit model that regresses a firm’s propensity to 
be a hedger against residuals from equation (11), UC_PCA_R and CC_PCA_R, and other 
determinants to examine the effects of UC and CC on firms' hedging decision.17 Equation (13) is 
                                                
16 We use firms that have never initiated any hedging programs as control firms. In our specification, the first differencing level 
is the change in UC or CC before and after the initiation of a hedging program for each treatment firm. The second differencing 
level is the change in UC or CC between control and treatment firms, with the aim to remove the impact of other changes 
concurrent with the initiation of new hedging program from the first-level differencing. The implicit assumption is that other 
changes affect both treatment and control firms similarly. 
17 Hedging determinants include firm size SIZE (+), leverage ratio LEVERAGE (+), profitability ROA (+),growth opportunities 
Invest_RD (+), underinvestment LEVERAGE*Invest_RD (+), interest burden INT_BD (+), tax convexity NOL (+), return 
volatility SIGMA (-), information asymmetry BAS (-), CEO effort-taking and risk-taking incentives CEO_ Delta (-) and 
CEO_Vega (+) and IND and Year dummies. They are common determinants of derivative hedging well-documented in the risk 
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a difference-in-differences OLS model that regresses future Rlpm_OCF against UC_PCA_R and 
CC_PCA_R, hedging indicator Hedger, the inverse Mills ratio Mills, and other controls. H3 
predicts that b1, b2 ≠ 0 and γ1, γ2 ≠ 0 in equations (12) and (13) respectively. 
CONit = α0 + α1CONit-1 + α2Rlpm_OCFit-1 + α3ROA it-1 + α4Sizeit-1  (11) 
   + α5Leverageit-1 + α6CEO_Deltait-1 + α7CEO_Vegait-1  
   + b9HedgerSit + ΣbnIndn + ΣboYearo + υit 
Hedgerit = b0 + b1UC_PCA_Rit-1 + b2CC_PCA_Rit-1 + Controls3it-1 + εit (12) 
Rlpm_OCFit = γ0 +γ1Postit*Hedgerit +γ2Hedgerit*UC_PCA_Rit-1*Postit  (13)  
   +γ3Hedgerit*CC_PCA_Rit-1*Postit + γ4UC_PCA_Rit-1  
    + γ5CC_PCA_Rit-1 +γ6Postit + γ7Millsit-1 + Controls4it + µit 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all variables and Table 2 presents Pearson and 
Spearman correlations among the major testing variables in its upper and lower triangles, 
respectively. The mean and median of Rlpm_OCF in Table 1 are 0.0936 and 0.0360, 
respectively, which are larger than the corresponding figures of -0.020 and 0.021 reported in Luo 
et al. (2012). This likely attributable to our inclusion of R&D and advertising expenses in OCF 
when calculating Rlpm_OCF to factor out growth potentials. Table 2 indicates strong 
contemporaneous partial correlations among the testing variables. Specifically, the three OCF 
downside risk measures (DOCF, Rlpm_OCF, CFaR) are significantly negatively correlated with 
all UC (UC_PCA, UC_ACC, UC_BM) and CC (CC_PCA, CC_ACM, CC_ARA, CC_CRA) 
metrics, except that CFaR exhibits a positive Spearman (Pearson) correlation with CC_ARA 
(CC_CRA). These results provide initial evidence that both UC and CC are negatively associated 
with OCF downside risk, consistent with hypothesis H1. The Pearson and Spearman correlations 
                                                                                                                                                       
management literature (Smith and Stulz 1985; Graham and Smith 1999; Barton 2001; Zhang 2009). Specifically, SIZE controls 
for the scale of economy in hedging. LEVERAGE and ROA proxy for incentives to use derivatives to reduce expected costs of 
financial distress and to facilitate external financing, and they are positively associated with increased incentives to use 
derivatives to prevent drops in profitability when firm performance is good. LEVERAGE*Invest_RD and Invest_RD, proxy for 
growth opportunities and incentives to use hedging to mitigate underinvestment problems, respectively, and both are expected to 
be positively related to hedging. INT_BD captures hedging incentives from increased interest burden, NOL captures taxation 
convexity incentives for hedging, and both are expected to be positively associated with hedging. CEO_Vega and CEO_Delta 
capture managerial risk-aversion and risk-taking incentives for hedging, respectively, with CEO_Vega (CEO_Delta) predicted to 
be positively (negatively) associated with hedging (Guay 1999; Zhang 2009). BAS captures the information asymmetry 
incentives and is expected to be negatively associated with hedging. 
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of DOCF and Rlpm_OCF with cash holdings Cash are consistently significantly negative, 
whereas those of CFaR with Cash are consistently positive. The Pearson and Spearman 
correlations of all OCF downside risk measures with the hedging indicators Hedger are 
consistently negative, suggesting that corporate hedging helps reduce OCF downside risk.  
4.2 Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and OCF Downside Risk 
Tables 3 to 5 report testing results for H1 regarding the direct effects of UC and CC on 
OCF downside risk. Table 3 presents results for logit model regressions of DOCF on lagged UC 
and CC and other control variables. In model 1, both UC and CC measures UC_PCAit-1 and 
CC_PCAit-1 are significantly negatively associated with DOCFit, with coefficients (t-statistics) of 
-0.4341 (-4.67) and -0.1436 (-2.48), respectively. Models 2 to 7 report results for other UC 
measures UC_ACCit-1, UC_BMit-1 and UC_RESit-1 simultaneously controlling for CC_PCAit-1, 
and results for other CC measures CC_AMit-1, CC_ARAit-1, and CC_CRAit-1 simultaneously 
controlling for UC_PCAit-1. UC measures UC_BMit-1 and UC_RESit-1 are significantly negatively 
associated with DOCFit, except that UC_ACCit-1 is insignificantly negatively associated with 
DOCFit. All CC measures CC_AMit-1, CC_ARAit-1, and CC_CRAit-1 are significantly negatively 
associated with DOCFit.18 These results strongly support hypothesis H1 by indicating that UC 
and CC mitigate subsequent OCF downside risk proxied by DOCF.19 
Table 4 reports results for the Fama-Macbeth regressions of the subsequent Rlpm_OCFit on 
UC and CC and other control variables. Model 1 shows both UC_PCAit-1 and CC_PCAit-1 to be 
strongly negatively associated with Rlpm_OCFit, with coefficients (t-statistics) of -0.0137 (-
                                                
18 A possible concern is that these results are influenced by R&D and marketing expenditures that increase hidden reserves, UC 
and OCF downside risk, thus creating a spurious positive relation between conservatism and OCF downside risk, particularly 
since R&D is often financed in stages (Bergemann, Hege, and Peng 2011). We address this possibility by adjusting all OCF 
downside risk measures for R&D expenditures as noted above. Further, even if this positive relation exists, it runs counter to the 
hypothesized and observed negative relation between conservatism and OCF downside risk, thus implying that if present, the 
true relation is more strongly negative than observed. 
19 The estimated coefficients for control variables are generally consistent with predictions. For example, the coefficient for cash 
holdings Cash is significantly negative in all models. The coefficients for capital investment Invest_CAPX and R&D investment 
Invest_RD are significantly negative, consistent with the notion that optimal investment increases future OCF and thus reduces 
the probability that a firm’s OCF fall below its expected level. Similarly, the coefficients on OO, ROA, LOSS, SIGMA,and 
CEO_Delta are significantly negative and Leverage, Size, and human resources slackness SLACK_emp increase with DOCF as 
predicted. 
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1.75) and -0.0587 (-17.06), respectively. Models 2 to 7 report results for each component of 
UC_PCAit-1 (CC_PCAit-1) after controlling for CC_PCAit-1 (UC_PCAit-1). All the UC and CC 
component measures (UC_ACCit-1, UC_BMit-1 and UC_RESit-1, CC_ACMit-1, CC_ARAit-1 and 
CC_CRAit-1) are significantly negatively associated with subsequent Rlpm_OCFit except for 
UC_BMit-1, which is insignificantly negatively associated with subsequent Rlpm_OCFit. These 
results suggest that both UC and CC reduce future OCF downside risk as proxied by OCF 
RLPM, thus further corroborating hypothesis H1. Coefficients for control variables are 
qualitatively consistent with those reported in Table 3. 
Table 5 reports results for the Fama-Macbeth regressions of subsequent OCF at risk CFaRit 
on UC and CC measures and other controlling variables. In model 1, CFaRit is significantly 
negatively associated with both UC_PCAit-1 and CC_PCAit-1, with coefficients (t-statistics) of -
0.1068 (-10.69) and -0.0448 (-11.28), respectively. Models 2 to 7 indicate that all the other UC 
measures UC_ACCit-1, UC_BMit-1, and UC_RESit-1 are significantly negatively associated with 
subsequent CFaRit, and the other CC measures CC_ACMit-1 and CC_CRAit-1 are significantly 
negatively associated with CFaRit, except that the coefficient on CC_ARAit-1 is insignificant. 
Results for the controlling variables are generally consistent with those in Table 4.20 These 
findings suggest that both UC and CC reduce OCF downside risk proxied by OCF at risk CFaR, 
which reconfirms conclusions derived from Tables 3 and 4 strongly supporting hypothesis H1. 
4.3  Conservatism, Cash Holdings and OCF Downside Risk 
Table 6 presents 3SLS regression results for testing H2 that both UC and CC mitigate OCF 
downside risk via the cash holdings channel for both the full sample and a subsample without 
R&D expenditures. The first-stage regressions of both 3SLS models orthogonalize conservatism 
                                                
20 We also use alternative measures for CFaR calculated using confidence levels of 5% and 10% with results qualitatively 
unchanged. 
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against cash holdings and demonstrate that previous cash holdings significantly decrease CC.21 
UC_PCA and CC_PCA are significantly negatively associated with lagged Rlpm_OCF, 
suggesting that firms with higher OCF downside risk are likely to have less conservative and 
more aggressive accounting choices. The second-stage cash model for the full sample shows that 
both UC and CC significantly enhance subsequent cash holdings, with coefficients (t-statistics) 
of 0.0165 (2.55) and 0.0120 (4.52), respectively. In turn, cash holdings are significantly 
negatively associated with subsequent Rlpm_OCF in the third-stage regression, with a 
coefficient (t-statistic) of -0.0655 (-8.24). These results suggest that cash holdings work as a 
mediating channel via which both UC and CC reduce OCF downside risk, with its meditating 
effect is equal to -0.0011 (= 0.0165*(-0.0655)) for UC and -0.0008 (= 0.0120*(-0.0655)) for CC. 
These findings strongly support H2 regarding the cash holdings channel. 
The 3SLS model analysis for the non-R&D subsample addresses the concern that the 
observed evidence for the full sample is attributable to R&D expenditures that drive both the 
increase in cash holdings and the negative relation between cash holdings and OCF downside 
risk. It is evident that the 3SLS results for the non-R&D subsample are qualitatively identical to 
those for the full sample analysis, thus dismissing R&D expenditures as an alternative 
explanation for our results. The third-stage Rlpm_OCF regressions in both 3SLS models further 
indicate that the interactions of UC and cash holdings are significantly negatively associated 
with Rlpm_OCF, suggesting that UC also indirectly affects OCF downside risk by enhancing the 
mitigating effects of cash holdings on OCF downside risk. 
4.4 Conservatism, Corporate Hedging and OCF Downside Risk  
Table 7 presents estimation results for the extended three-stage Heckman (1979) models 
examining H3 regarding the hedging channel. The 1st-stage UC_PCA and CC_PCA regressions 
                                                
21 This is explainable from three aspects. Firms holding more cash for risk management reasons reduces negative shocks to 
earnings, and these firms are also cautious in operations and investments, both of which naturally reduce the occurrence of bad 
earnings news; with sufficient cash in hand, firms have weak incentives to apply higher CC to obtain external financing at a 
lower cost of debt; firms with more free cash flows are subject to more serious agency problems and tend to withhold bad 
earnings news. 
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in the first two columns address reverse causality between accounting conservatism and hedging 
and indicate that Hedger is significantly positively associated only with UC_PCA, thus implying 
that hedging firms tend to choose higher UC as well. Lagged Rlpm_OCF is significantly 
negatively associated with both UC_PCA and CC_PCA, suggesting that firms with higher OCF 
downside risk are likely to have less conservative reporting. The column “2nd-stage Probit Model 
for Hedger” shows that lagged CC_PCAit-1 is significantly positively associated with the 
probability that a firm initiates a new hedging program, with a coefficient (t-statistic) of 0.0705 
(1.77). This evidence is consistent with the argument that timely warnings of rising risk 
exposures via CC promote corporate hedging activities. In contrast, UC_PCAit-1 is significantly 
negatively associated with the probability that a firm initiates a new hedging program, with a 
coefficient (t-statistic) of -0.1587 (-1.64). Combined with the 1st-stage results, these findings 
suggest that UC is a preferred choice for risk management possibly due to its low cost and 
consistent application, with UC substituting for hedging usage to some degree.22 
The last column entitled “3rd-stage Model for Rlpm_OCF” report results for the third-stage 
difference-in-differences OLS regression after controlling for selection bias and other 
determinants. Initiating a hedging program significantly reduces subsequent OCF downside risk, 
as indicated by the significantly negative coefficient on interactions of Hedger and Post -0.1040, 
a result consistent with Campello et al. (2010), Smith and Stulz (1985) and Stulz (1996). 
Combined with the second-stage results, this evidence implies that CC increases Hedger, which 
in turn reduces subsequent OCF downside risk, such that Hedger works as a mediating channel 
for CC to decrease OCF downside risk. A likely explanation is that by signaling bad news in a 
timely fashion, CC enhances monitoring and incentives to improve the effectiveness of ongoing 
hedging programs and to initiate productive new hedging programs that mitigate risk exposures 
                                                
22 Results for the controlling variables in the second-stage regression is generally consistent with the risk management literature; 
in particular, INT_BD, Leverage, Leverage*Invest_RD, ROA and SIZE are positively associated with all hedging types, whereas 
coefficients on BAS and SIGMA are negative. 
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and negative OCF shocks. This result is consistent with H3 in suggesting that CC complements 
hedging in reducing OCF downside risk. In addition, the 3rd-stage result that hedging usage 
mitigates OCF downside risk, combined with the findings from the 2nd-stage probit model that 
UC reduces hedging usage, confirm that UC substitutes for hedging in reducing OCF downside 
risk, consistent with H3. The 3rd-stage Rlpm_OCF model further demonstrates that the 
interaction of UC_PCA_R, Hedger, and Post is significantly positively associated with OCF 
downside risk, with a coefficient (t-statistics) 0.0577 (2.34), implying that UC mitigates the 
effectiveness of Hedging for OCF downside risk. These findings provide further evidence that 
UC serves as a substitute for hedging. 
4.5 Exogenous Economic Shocks on Relations between Conservatism and OCF Downside 
Risk 
This section examines the effects of exogenous negative economic shocks proxied by 
downside cash flow covariance on relations between conservatism and OCF downside risk using 
the 3SLS model below. We use two downside cash flow covariance measures Dcfbeta1 and 
Dcfbeta2, which are defined as the ranking of industry adjusted downside cash flow beta, and 
industry and risk-free rate adjusted downside cash flow beta respectively, extending Ismail and 
Kim (1989) and Ang et al. (2006): 
Shockit = γ0 + γ1UC_PCAit-1 + γ2CC_PCAit-1 + γ2SIZEit-1 + γ3Leverageit-1  (14) 
   + γ4ROAit-1 + γ5Shockit-1 +γ6 CEO_Deltait-1 + γ7 CEO_Vegait-1  
   + ΣbmIndm + ΣbnYearn + µit 
CONit = α0 + α1SIZEit-1 + α2Leverageit-1 + α3ROAit-1 + α4CONit-1 + α5Shock_Rit-1 (15) 
   +α6 CEO_Deltait-1 +α7 CEO_Vegait-1 + ΣbmIndm + ΣbnYearn + µit 
Rlpm_OCFit = β0 + β1UC_PCA_Rit-1* Shock_Rit + β2CC_PCA_Rit-1* Shock_Rit (16) 
   + β3 Shock_Rit + Controls5it-1 + µit 
where CON = UC_PCA and CC_PCA, Shock = Dcfbeta1, Dcfbeta2, and Controls5 are the same 
as in model (7). The purpose of the first stage regression is to net out any potential effect of UC 
and CC on downside cash flow beta as firm-level accounting conservatism can impact the 
feedback of macro-economy by altering the measurement attributes of key macroeconomic 
indicators (Crawley 2012). The estimated residuals from equation (14), Shock_R, and from 
  
 
 
26 
equation (15), UC_PCA_R and CC_PCA_R, are used in the third-stage regressions. We expect 
that α5 > 0 and/or β1, β2 < 0, and Table 8 reports the results for the second and third-stage 
regressions. 
Consistent with our conjecture, models 1 and 2 show that both measures of downside cash 
flow beta Dcfbeta1 and Dcfbeta2 are significantly positively associated with subsequent 
UC_PCA and CC_PCA, which in turn are significantly negatively associated with future 
Rlpm_OCF. Moreover, the interactions of UC_PCA_Rit-1 with downside OCF covariance 
measures Dcfbeta1_R, Dcfbeta2_R are significantly negatively associated with subsequent 
Rlpm_OCF. These findings support the notion that downside cash flow beta enhances the risk 
management role of UC and CC during economic downturns, thus reducing the adverse effects 
of shocks from the aggregate economy on firm-level OCF shortfalls. 
4.7 Sensitivity Tests 
Alternative OCF Downside Risk Measurements  
To examine whether our results are robust to different OCF expectation models, we replace 
the OCF forecast model with the following OCF benchmarks: previous year industry mean of 
OCF, previous five-year mean of firm-specific OCF, and zero OCF. Then we recalculate the 
RRLPMs of OCF and denote them as DR_OCFind, DR_OCFpre and DR_OCFzero, respectively. 
To examine whether our results are robust to varied formulas for Rlpm_OCF, we alternatively 
define Rlpm_OCF2 as the natural logarithm of one plus the RLPM of OCF without deflating by 
the RUPM of OCF, and define Rlpm_OCF3 as the natural logarithm of one plus the RLPM of 
OCF deflated by the standard deviation of OCF. Panel A of Table 9 reports the estimation results 
for Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of these alternate OCF downside risk measures 
against lagged UC and CC measures, extending model (7). Models 1 to 5 reveal results 
qualitatively identical to those reported in Table 4. 
To assess the effect of survival bias, we use a horizon of five rather three years to calculate 
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Rlpm_OCF, with main results qualitatively unchanged. To address the concern that the 
estimation of the CFaR may be unreliable because there are eight independent variables and the 
model is estimated using seventeen firm-quarter observations, we drop the quarter dummies and 
include only five variables in the quarterly OCF expectation model, with estimation results 
qualitatively unchanged.  
Alternative Accounting Conservatism Measurements 
Some prior studies use negative skewness (SKEW) as a CC measure (e.g., Givoly and Hyan 
2000). To test its effect, we estimate CC_Skew as the predicted values of SKEWit from the 
following OLS regression model to capture skewness caused by asymmetrical accrual 
timeliness: 
SKEWit = β0 + β1UC_ACCit + β2CC_ACMit + εit. (17) 
We also calculate CC_PCAA, the factor score generated from a PCA of CC_Skew, CC_ACM and 
CC_CRA, and report the results for the logit model for DOCF as well as Fama-Macbeth models 
for Rlpm_OCF and CFaR in Panel B of Table 10. Models 1 to 6 show that CC_Skew and 
CC_PCAA are significantly negatively associated with Rlpm_OCF and CFaR, except for the 
insignificant result for DOCF, suggesting that our results are robust to alternative CC measures. 
Controls for Investors’ Monitoring 
We use a 2SLS model to determine whether investor monitoring affects observed relations 
between conservatism and OCF downside risk. We add as further controls the negative of 
GScore, institutional ownership, board independence (ratio of the number of independent 
directors to board size) and debtholder monitoring (ratio of long-term debt to total debt) to the 
first-stage regression of UC or CC, and to the second-stage regression of future Rlpm_OCF.23 
We find that although these monitoring variables increase UC and CC and mitigate subsequent 
Rlpm_OCF, UC and CC continue to significantly reduce subsequent Rlpm_OCF. 
                                                
23We obtain GScore and board structure data from RiskMetrics, institutional shareholdings data from Thomposon-Reuters 
Institutional Holdings database, board duality information from Execucomp as indicated by a current CEO also having the title 
of “chairman”, “chmn”, “Chairman”, “CHAIRMAN”, “Chmn” or “CHMN”. 
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Controls for Earnings Smoothing 
Earnings smoothing has been characterized as a risk management tool that partially 
substitutes for hedging (Barton 2001). It is also associated with a phenomenon called 
“conservatism gaming”, whereby higher conservatism during good economic times and lower 
conservatism during bad times generates a negative association between conservatism and 
bankruptcy risk (BMS 2012). Because conservatism is accrual-based and associated with 
earnings smoothing (BMS 2012), a potential concern arises as to whether the risk management 
role of accounting conservatism for OCF downside risk is robust to earnings smoothing. 
However, conservatism and earnings smoothing are not the same. For example, conservatism 
increases earnings volatility (Givoly and Hyan 2000; Ball and Shivakumar 2005, 2006) whereas 
earnings smoothing reduces earnings volatility (Barton 2001). Hence, we expect the risk 
management role of conservatism to be insensitive to earnings smoothing. To address the effects 
of earnings smoothing, we repeat all previous analyses by adding both innate and discretionary 
smoothing as additional controls.24 Untabulated results show that reported results are robust to 
their controls, with discretionary smoothing significantly positively associated with Rlpm_OCF 
and DOCF, consistent with the intuition of Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) and Leuz, 
Nanda, and Wysocki (2003). 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines whether unconditional and conditional conservatism directly mitigate 
OCF downside risk, and whether they indirectly mitigate OCF downside risk via two established 
risk management instruments – cash holdings and corporate hedging. Our findings indicate that 
(1) both UC and CC directly mitigate subsequent OCF downside risk measured by the 
probability that a firm’s future OCF deviates below its expected level, by OCF RRLPM, and by 
OCF at risk; (2) both UC and CC enhance cash holdings that reduce OCF downside risk; (3) UC 
                                                
24 Innate smoothing is measured as the product of negative one times the Spearman correlation between total accruals and OCF; 
discretionary smoothing is measured as the product of negative one times the ratio of the standard deviations of net income and 
OCF. 
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(CC) serves as a substitute for (complement) new hedging programs that reduce OCF downside 
risk. Further tests for the effect of the exogenous economic condition of downside cash flow beta 
reveals it to enhance the mitigating effect of UC and CC on subsequent OCF downside risk. 
These findings are robust to alternate measures and specifications and lend support to accounting 
conservatism serving a risk mitigation role with respect to OCF downside risk. 
This study contributes to the accounting conservatism literature by documenting relations 
between accounting conservatism and OCF downside risk, channels by which they operate, and 
conditioning by cash flow beta. They contribute to the risk management literature by 
establishing conservatism as an accounting-based instrument that firms can employ in concert 
with other risk management tools. They extend the downside risk literature by introducing three 
accounting-based OCF downside risk measures within the RRLPM and VaR frameworks that 
better control for growth effects and OFC asymmetry. They also contribute to a growing 
literature relating accounting information quality and economic recessions by providing 
evidence that the risk management effects of UC and CC strengthen during economic downturns. 
Our findings also have practical implications for economic policy-making and accounting 
standard-setting in suggesting conservatism as a relatively low-cost accounting-based risk 
management tool that is especially effective during economic downturns when exogenous 
economic shocks are severe. Finally, they help explain conservatism’s longstanding use and 
standing as a central tenant of financial accounting and will help inform deliberations regarding 
its future. 
This study’s initial evidence regarding relations between accounting conservatism and 
OCF downside properties opens several avenues for future research. For instance, future studies 
can examine how conservatism affects other properties of cash holdings, other cash flows and 
additional firm attributes. Future studies can also consider relations between accounting 
conservatism on other risk dimensions and their implications for risk management tools for 
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managers and policy makers. Importantly, these findings also lend support to further 
examinations of the costs and benefits of accounting conservatism as a longstanding feature and 
pervasive attribute of financial accounting. 
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Appendix A  Benchmark Models for Operating Cash Flows  
This study utilizes the following prediction model for expected OCF: 
OCFt+1 = β0 + β1OCFt + β2OCFt-1 + β3OCFt-2 + β4SALEt + β5SIZEt + β8 LEVERAGEt (a1) 
+ β6STD_OCFt + Year_Dummies + εt+1. 
Model (a1) combines an autoregressive AR (3) structure for the time series of OCF and the economic 
determinants of OCF. Dechow et al. (1998) report that an AR (3) model for OCF improves predictability. In Model 
(a1), the ratio of total sales to total assets SALE is a major determinant of both OCF and earnings as suggested by 
Barth Cram, and Nelson (2001) and Dechow et al. (1998). Further, SALE is a substitute for earnings, another 
determinant of the predictability of future OCF (e.g., Barth, Beaver, Hand, and Landsman 2005; Kim and Kross 
2005), but without introducing endogeniety between conservatism and OCF downside risk unlike accrual-based 
earnings. Both SIZE and operating cycle (OC) have been employed as determinants for OCF expectation models in 
prior research (Dechow et al. 1998). However, Hui et al. (2012) suggest that conservatism may shorten operating 
cycles by increasing trading contract efficiencies. Therefore, we omit OC from Model (a1). Model (a1) also includes 
Leverage whose impact on OCF is difficult to predict. Opler and Titman (1994) document that financially distressed 
firms lose significant market share to healthier counterparts during industry downturns, and Froot et al. (1993) 
suggest that higher leverage causes firms to forgo positive NPV projects due to costly external financing. 
Leveragetcould also proxy for interest expenses since firm size is controlled. SFAS No. 95 requires interest expenses 
to be reported as an OCF rather than as a financing flow, which would create a negative mechanical relation 
between Leverage and the subsequent OCF. However, high Leverage also implies that firms already use sufficient 
external financing to support operations and investment activities, which tends to increase subsequent OCF. 
Therefore, the relation between Leverage and OCF is an open empirical question. Industry cash flow risk is a 
determinant of the predictability of OCF, yet estimation by industry already serves to control for its effects. In 
addition, firm-specific cash flow risk tends to increase cash flow uncertainty and difficulties in predicting OCF 
(Minton et al. 2002). Thus, STD_OCF is included in Model (a1) and is calculated as the volatility of quarterly OCF 
over the current and previous eleven fiscal quarters, with a minimum of four quarters of OCF data.25 Lastly, year 
dummies are included to capture temporal factors that impact OCF predictability. 
Following the intuition of Stein et al. (2001), we delete firm-years below the lower-end 5% of total assets for 
a given fiscal year to alleviate concerns that small firm size could disproportionately inflate the OCF ratio and bias 
OCF predictions, which results in 73,598 firm-year observations. We fit Model (a1) by Fama-French (1997) 
industry classifications, and the average R-square is 0.2390.26 The coefficients on OCFt, OCFt-2, SALEt and SIZEt 
are significantly positive in most industries, and the coefficients on Leverage are mixed (significantly positive in 
eight industries and significantly negative in seven industries), consistent with prior evidence. The means and t-
statistics of the estimated coefficients for Model (a1) are as follows:  
OCFt+1 = -0.0016 + 0.2407*OCFt + 0.0158*OCFt-1 + 0.0157*OCFt-2 + 0.0339*SALEt  
    (-0.08)     (4.73)***             (0.85)                 (2.59)**                (3.89)*** 
+ 0.0092*SIZEt  - 0.01*LEVERAGEt - 0.0048 STD_OCFt + Year_Dummies 
   (6.26)***       (-0.00)                        (-0.11) 
When the market value of equity is used to deflate OCF, results are qualitatively unchanged. Estimated residuals 
and fitted values from Model (a1) are used to calculate DOCF and Rlpm_ OCF for our main tests. In robustness 
tests, we also use ROA instead of SALE in Model (a1) and results are qualitatively unchanged, indicating that 
endogeneity is not a serious concern. We also include operating cycle OC in Model (a1). We define OC as the 
average time between purchasing or acquiring inventory and receiving cash from their sales, and gauge it as the 
natural logarithm of 360 days times the ratios of average accounts receivable (Compustat RECT) to total revenue 
(Compustat SALE), and of average inventory (Compustat INVT) to cost of goods sold (Compustat COGS). The 
coefficients on OC is insignificant for most industries, the addition of OC does not greatly improve the R-square, 
and the empirical results are qualitatively unchanged, suggesting that any conservatism bias caused by OC is not a 
serious concern. 
                                                
25 We use quarterly data to estimate cash flow risk STD_OCF. STD_OCF thus calculated is positively correlated with STD_OCF 
calculated using annual OCF, and it increases the sample size greatly compared with using previous three to five years' annual 
OCF data. 
26 This model is fitted by industry rather than by year because OCF properties are shaped more by industry features. The average 
R-square drops from about 24% to 18% when the model is fitted by fiscal year with industry dummies. 
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Appendix B  Comparables Approach for Cash Flow at Risk (CFaR) 
 
Extending Stein et al. (2001), this study uses a comparables approach to calculate OCF at risk, CFaR, using 
quarterly data from 1993 to 2007. The estimation procedures are as follows: 
1. Delete firm-quarters with total assets in the lowest 5% tails for each quarter so that the ratio of quarterly OCF to 
total assets OCFQ will not be biased upwards due to small firm size problem (Stein et al. 2001). Also remove 
firm-quarters that experience changes in total assets of more than 50% in a quarter due to M&A activities, 
capital expenditures, or other dramatic changes. 
2. Starting from the first fiscal quarter of 1993, fit the following OCFQ benchmark model using cross-sectional 
data over a rolling window of seventeen fiscal quarters, including the current quarter t, and sixteen previous 
fiscal quarters: 
OCFQt  = β0 + β1OCFQt-1 + β2OCFQt-2 + β3OCFQt-3 + β4OCFQt-4 + γ1Q1 + γ2Q2 + γ3Q3 + εt, (b1) 
where Q1 to Q3 are dummies for the first to third fiscal quarters, respectively.27 The rolling window allows the target 
quarter t to have at most seventeen observations to fit the model for each industry. The rationale for this model is as 
follows. Lorek and Willinger (2008) report that the parsimonious (100)*(011) ARIMA model of quarterly OCF in 
Brown and Rozeff (1979) performs the best among all documented quarterly OCF estimation models (Lorek,  
Schaefer, and Willinger 1993; Lorek and Willinger 1996).28 However, the Brown-Rozeff model is a univariate 
parsimonious model that ignores economic determinants of quarterly OCF and information in lag two and three of 
OCFQ because it assumes that the fourth differences in quarterly OCF follow an AR (1) process. Stein et al. (2001) 
alternatively recommend an AR (4) model with dummies for each quarter capturing earnings seasonality. 
Combining the merits of both types of models arrives at Model (b2) below with quarter dummies capturing 
seasonality and unobserved firm-specific determinants: 
OCFQt  = β0 + β1OCFQt-1 + β2OCFQt-2 + β3OCFQt-3 + β4OCFQt-4 + β5OCFQt-5 + γ1Q1 + γ2Q2+ γ3Q3 + εt (b2) 
Model (b2) includes the fifth lag of OCFQ but relaxes the restrictive assumption regarding the fourth difference that 
underlies the Brown-Rozeff (1979) model. However empirical results show that the coefficient on OCFt-5 is 
insignificant, so we omit the fifth lag, and Model (b2) collapse into Model (b1), the model we use to calculate CFaR. 
3. For each firm-quarter observation, calculate OCFQ forecast errors, the deviations of actual OCFQ to its 
predicted value, as the estimated residual έt from the benchmark model (b1). 
4. Take the natural logarithm of the squared OCFQ forecast error (έt*έt) and regress it on market capitalization 
(MV), annual asset turnover (SALE), stock volatility (Sigma), and Fama-French (1997) industry dummies. Use 
coefficients on industry dummies to represent the industry cash flow risk for estimating OCFQ forecast errors. 
5. Sort the OCFQ forecast errors (έt) for the seventeen quarters along the following four dimensions for each 
quarter t: (1) MV; (2) SALE;29 (3) industry cash flow risk estimated from Step 4; and (4) Sigma calculated using 
daily price over the prior quarter. Put another way, έt's are first sorted into four buckets by market capitalization, 
and then each bucket is subdivided into four buckets by asset turnover. Each sub-bucket is further divided into 
four buckets based on industry risk, and each of the resulting sixty-four buckets is further subdivided into four 
sub-buckets in terms of Sigma. Ultimately, we get 4*4*4*4 = 256 sub-buckets for each quarter, each possessing 
approximately 160-200 forecast errors with relatively homogenous characteristics along these four dimensions. 
The roughly 160-200 forecast errors in each bin can reasonably describe a target firm-quarter’s distribution of 
forecast errors, and the lowest forecast errors at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels are assigned to each 
target firm-quarter in each bin. Then CFaR for that quarter is calculated as negative one times that assigned 
forecast error divided by the fitted expected OCFQ from Model (b1), and only the CFaR for the last quarter is 
kept. The above procedures are repeated for each successive quarter through the fourth quarter of 2007, and we 
only use only the 4th quarter CFaR data to merge with our main sample. 
This comparables approach for estimating CFaR offers several advantages: First, within any given peer 
group, the model produces relatively reasonable estimates on average. Second, the model is non-parametric in that it 
obtains each forecast error from an expectation model that is peer-benchmarked by risk, thereby avoiding imposing 
the unrealistic assumption that shocks to OCFQ are parametrically distributed. However, this method is sensitive to 
the expectation model employed because it attributes all the forecast errors to the estimated CFaR, assuming away 
any estimation error. 
                                                
27 Similar to the adjustment to OCF in Model (a1), this study also adjusts quarterly OCF by adding back concurrent R&D and 
marketing expenditures. This treatment mitigates the concern that the immediate expensing of R&D and marketing costs causes a 
mechanical negative relationship between OCF and hidden reserve UC_RES. 
28 The Brown and Rozeff (1979) model is expressed as OCFt = OCFt-4 + φ2(OCFt-1 - OCFt-5) + εt - θ1εt-4. 
29 Stein et al. (2001) use earnings as a partitioning variable. Instead, this study uses the ratio of sales to assets because it is less 
subject to conservatism bias and is the most important variable that affects bankruptcy risk (Altman 1968). The ratio of sales to 
assets is calculated as the sum of the previous four periods’ sales to the previous four periods’ total assets. 
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 Table 1  Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables 
This table reports summary statistics for the full sample of firm-year observations from 1992 through 2007. Variable 
definitions are presented at the bottom of the table. 
Variables Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 
DOCF 0.5798 0.4936 0 1 1 
Rlpm_OCF(Raw) 0.0936 0.2970 -0.0715 0.0360 0.1321 
CFaR(Raw) 0.5329 9.5376 0.1133 0.2018 0.3410 
UC_PCA 0.3778 0.2170 0.1953 0.3809 0.5613 
UC_ACC 0.0027 0.0461 -0.0197 0.0027 0.0241 
UC_BM(Raw) 0.3051 3.8507 -0.1301 0.1500 0.4684 
UC_RES 0.0897 0.2732 0 0.0242 0.1049 
CC_PCA 0.6162 0.3283 0.3731 0.6144 0.8594 
CC_ACM -0.0002 0.0822 -0.0305 0.0072 0.0362 
CC_ARA(Raw) -0.5937 23.0188 -0.7546 -0.7133 -0.6550 
CC_CRA(Raw) -0.0633 8.0455 -0.7135 -0.3564 0.6566 
Cash 0.1209 0.1477 0.0195 0.0636 0.1674 
Dcfbeta1(Raw) 0.0742 33.8940 -0.0194 0.0716 0.6005 
Dcfbeta2(Raw) 0.0774 35.1553 0.0031 0.1045 0.6608 
Invest_CAPX 0.0627 0.4102 0.0223 0.0429 0.4102 
Invest_RD 0.0291 0.0612 0 0 0.0325 
ΔCash -0.0068 0.9585 -0.0133 0.0028 0.0307 
DISSUE 0.0040 0.0528 0 0 0 
DIV 0.0072 0.0216 0 0 0.0064 
Leverage 0.1925 0.1621 0.0357 0.1775 0.3061 
LOSS 0.1774 0.3820 0 0 0 
NWC 0.1062 0.1963 -0.0207 0.0831 0.2295 
OO 0.5835 0.3978 0.2806 0.5012 0.8114 
ROA 0.0371 0.1011 0.0149 0.0484 0.0840 
Growth 0.0084 4.6875 0.0030 0.0803 0.1623 
INT 0.0032 0.0097 0 0 0.0020 
NOL 0.0777 0.2677 0 0 0 
Sigma 0.4576 0.2476 0.2877 0.3993 0.5579 
SIZE 1.8449 0.3250 1.6326 1.8813 2.0804 
SLACK -0.3435 2.2937 -0.3728 -0.1488 0.0256 
SLACK_EMP -0.0051 0.1727 -0.0049 -0.0019 0.0005 
CEO_Delta 0.0076 0.0381 0 0 0.0004 
CEO_Vega 0.0970 0 0 0.0056 1.1365 
INT_BD 0.1451 5.1587 0 0.0834 0.2452 
BAS 0.0219 0.0274 0.0044 0.0136 0.0274 
DOCF is a dummy variable indicating that actual OCF is belower OCF expection estimated from a benchmark OCF model for a 
given firm-year. It is equal to 1 if the residual from the OCF benchmark model is negative, and 0 otherwise. Rlpm_OCF is the 
ranked natural logarithm of the ratio of one plus OCF root lower partial moment, over one plus OCF root upper partial moment 
calculated in the current and previous two years. Refer to the text and Appewndix A for expectation models for both DOCF and 
Rlpm_OCF. CFaR is the ranked percentage shortfall below expected quarterly OCF at a 1% confidence level estimated from a 
probability distribution of firm-quarter OCF of the firm and its comparable peers using a non-parametric approach. The 
expectation model for quarterly OCF is detailed in Appendix B. UC_PCA is the factor score from a PCA of three UC measures: 
UC_ACC, UC_BM and UC_RES. UC_ACC is equal to minus one times total accruals to average total assets, calculated over a 
rolling window of current year and prior two years, where total accruals are calculated as: Total accrualsit = net income before 
extraordinary itemsit (Compustat IB) - operating cash flowit (Compustat OANCF) + depreciation expenseit (Compustat DP). 
UC_BM is the industry-adjusted ranking of minus one times book to market value of common equity at the fiscal year-end. 
UC_RES is hidden reserve resulting from LIFO, R&D and marketing expenses to total assets. CC_PCA is the factor score from 
a PCA of three CC measures: CC_ACM, CC_ARA and CC_CRA. CC_ACM is equal to minus one times accumulated non-
operating accruals to accumulated total assets, calculated over a rolling window of the current year and prior two years, with 
non-operating accruals calculated as Total accruals - Δaccounts receivable (Compustat RECT) - Δinventories (Compustat INVT) 
- Δprepaid expenses (Compustat XPP) + Δaccounts payable (Compustat AP) + Δtaxes payable (Compustat TXP). CC_ARA is 
equal to the ranked ratio of the sum of C_score and G_score over G_score, with C_score and G_score estimated from an 
extended model from Khan and Watts (2009) detailed in the text. CC_CRA is equal to current accrual shocks to total accrual 
news for bad accrual news, with the ratio multiplied by -1 for good accrual news cases, adapting Callen et al. (2006). Cash is 
cash holdings (Compustat CHE) to total assets (Compustat AT). Dcfbeta1is an accounting-based measure for downside OCF 
covariance during economic downturns relative to upturns and is calculated as the ranking of industry adjusted downside OCF 
covariance. Dcfbeta2 is an accounting-based measure for downside OCF covariance during economic downturns relative to 
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upturns and is calculated as the ranking of industry and risk-free rate adjusted downside OCF covariance. ΔCash is cash flow 
(Compustat CHECH) to total assets (Compustat AT).  Dissue is net long-term debt issuance (Compustat DLTIS) over long-term 
debt reduction (Compustat DLTR) to total assets (Compustat AT). DIV is cash dividend (Compustat DV) to total assets 
(Compustat AT). Growth is sales changes to sales (Compustat SALE) for the previous year. Invest_CAPX is capital 
expenditures (Compustat CAPX) to total assets (Compustat AT). Invest_RD is R&D expenditures (Compustat XRD) to total 
assets (Compustat AT). Leverage is book value of long-term debt (Compustat DLTT) and short-term debt (Compustat DLC) to 
total assets (Compustat AT). LOSS is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has negative income for the current fiscal year, 
and zero otherwise. NWC is working capital (Compustat WCAP) net of cash holdings (Compustat CHE) to total assets 
(Compustat AT). OO is total property, plant and equipment (Compustat PPEGT) to total assets (Compustat AT). ROA is net 
income to assets (Compustat AT). Sigma is the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock return over the prior twelve 
months. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the sum of the market value of equity (Compustat PRCC_F, Compustat CSHO), total 
liabilities (Compustat LT), and the carrying value of preferred stock (Compustat PSTK). SLACK is the average of the industry-
adjusted ratio of inventory (Compustat INVT) to total revenue (Compustat SALE), of accounts receivable (Compustat RECT) to 
total revenue (Compustat SALE), and of selling, general and administrative expense (Compustat XSGA) to total revenue 
(Compustat SALE). SLACK_EMP is the industry-adjusted ratio of total number of employees at fiscal year-end (Compustat 
EMP) to total revenue (Compustat SALE). INT_BD is interest expense (Compustat XINT) to operating income before 
depreciation and interest (Compustat OPINCAR). INT is the interaction of R&D investment (Invest_RD) and leverage ratio 
(Leverage). NOL is an indicator variable equal to one for positive net income and positive net operating loss carry forwards, and 
zero otherwise. CEO_Vega is the natural logarithm of the sensitivity of CEO's firm-specific equity-based wealth to a 1% change 
in the firm’s stock return volatility. CEO_Delta is the natural logarithm of the sensitivity of CEO's firm-specific equity-based 
wealth to a 1% change in stock price. BAS is the average daily percentage bid ask spread in the fiscal year. 
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Table 2  Correlation Matrix for Main Testing Variables for the Full Sample 
This table reports pairwise correlations among downside risks metrics and accrual-based conservatism measures, cash holdings, hedging dummy, 
and downside cash flow betas. The upper triangle displays Pearson correlations and the lower triangle displays Spearman correlations. 
Highlighted figures indicate statistical significance beyond the 90% confidence level. All variable definitions except for Hedger are presented at 
the bottom of Table 1. 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. DOCF 1 0.6451 0.0115 -0.0508 -0.0078 -0.0407 -0.0581 -0.0165 -0.0256 -0.0599 -0.0188 -0.0497 -0.0262 -0.0191 -0.0183 
2. Rlpm_OCF 0.6453 1 0.0084 -0.1197 -0.1627 -0.0784 -0.1125 -0.1373 -0.0806 -0.0714 -0.1545 -0.1122 -0.0286 -0.0197 -0.0194 
3. CFaR 0.0531 0.1053 1 0.0114 0.0031 0.0034 0.0456 -0.0017 -0.0062 0.0098 0.0067 0.0124 -0.0070 0.0012 0.0012 
4. UC_PCA -0.0533 -0.1226 -0.1004 1 0.2044 0.9697 0.2090 0.1621 0.0978 -0.0556 0.1360 0.0582 0.0307 0.0727 0.0720 
5. UC_ACC -0.0082 -0.1611 -0.0515 0.1973 1 0.0419 0.0950 0.4510 0.4192 -0.0324 0.2705 0.1466 0.0171 0.0002 0.0000 
6. UC_BM -0.0418 -0.0799 -0.0917 0.9787 0.0525 1 0.0136 0.0999 0.0296 -0.0681 0.1037 -0.0167 0.1234 0.0721 0.0715 
7. UC_RES -0.1121 -0.1690 -0.0933 0.0841 0.0337 -0.0148 1 -0.0007 0.0429 0.0803 -0.0185 0.2894 -0.0385 0.0186 0.0181 
8. CC_PCA -0.0155 -0.1357 -0.0016 0.1627 0.4675 0.0994 -0.0092 1 0.7332 -0.2474 0.7400 -0.0044 0.0392 -0.0050 -0.0049 
9. CC_ACM -0.0257 -0.0817 -0.0345 0.0955 0.4166 0.0277 0.0217 0.7282 1 -0.0280 0.1314 0.0701 0.0224 0.0035 0.0038 
10. CC_ARA -0.0661 -0.0810 0.0864 -0.0501 -0.0476 -0.0569 0.0637 -0.2362 -0.0300 1 -0.0421 -0.0162 -0.0994 -0.0191 -0.0184 
11. CC_CRA -0.0192 -0.1550 0.0609 0.1368 0.2949 0.1025 -0.0171 0.7351 0.1311 -0.0421 1 0.3917 0.0285 -0.0120 -0.0119 
12. Cash -0.0422 -0.1096 0.0010 0.0402 0.1275 -0.0259 0.3611 0.0170 0.0769 0.0957 0.0162 1 -0.1012 -0.0096 -0.0096 
13. Hedger  -0.0262 -0.0326 -0.0325 0.0867 0.0527 0.1279 -0.0329 0.0602     0.0223 -0.0975 0.0455 -0.1019 1 0.0278 0.0275 
14. Dcfbeta1 -0.0153 0.0050 0.0026 0.1051 -0.0479 0.1169 -0.0310 -0.0284 -0.0418 0.0210 -0.0017 -0.0634 0.0155 1 0.9985 
15. Dcfbeta2 -0.0183 -0.0001 0.0007 0.1060 -0.0534 0.1183 -0.0284 -0.0310 -0.0473 0.0255 0.0007 -0.0683 0.0108 0.9913 1 
Hedger is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with a hedger program and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 3  Logit Model Estimation Results for Relations between Unconditional and 
Conditional Conservatism and Indicator for OCF Downside Risk DOCF 
This table reports estimation results for logit model regressions of OCF downside risk indicator DOCF on unconditional 
and conditional conservatism metrics UC_PCA, UC_ACC, UC_BM and UC_RES, and CC_PCA, CC_ACM, CC_ARA 
and CC_CRA. Model specifications and variable definitions are presented at the bottom of this table and Table 1, 
respectively. 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 0.8439 0.7818 0.8380 0.7853 0.7978 0.8309 1.0104 
 (5.11)*** (4.75)*** (5.07)*** (4.78)*** (4.84)*** (5.04)*** (5.91)*** 
UC_PCAit-1 -0.4341    -0.4418 -0.4386 -0.4604 
 (-4.67)***    (-4.77)*** (-4.73)*** (-5.00)*** 
CC_PCAit-1 -0.1436 -0.1858 -0.1628 -0.1798    
 (-2.48)*** (-2.97)*** (-2.82)*** (-3.13)***    
UC_ACCit-1  0.1516      
  (0.33)      
UC_BMit-1   -0.2542     
   (-3.70)***     
UC_RES it-1    -0.2924    
    (-4.71)***    
CC_ACMit-1     -0.6279   
     (-2.79)***   
CC_ARAit-1      -0.1620  
      (-2.50)***  
CC_CRAit-1       -0.3117 
       (-4.38)*** 
Cashit-1 -0.4279 -0.4778 -0.4550 -0.4384 -0.4156 -0.4274 -0.3977 
 (-2.89)*** (-3.21)*** (-3.08)*** (-2.96)*** (-2.81)*** (-2.89)*** (-2.68)*** 
ΔCashit-1 0.0088 0.0090 0.0090 0.0085 0.0090 0.0086 0.0092 
 (0.59) (0.60) (0.60) (0.58) (0.60) (0.57) (0.60) 
Invest_CAPXit-1 0.0264 0.0236 0.0258 0.0241 0.0255 0.0273 0.0293 
 (0.45) (0.42) (0.44) (0.43) (0.44) (0.46) (0.48) 
Invest_RDit-1 -7.6019 -7.9860 -7.8190 -7.4107 -7.5873 -7.6097 -7.5250 
 (-17.90)*** (-19.08)*** (-18.62)*** (-17.19)*** (-17.86)*** (-17.93)*** (-17.73)*** 
Leverageit-1 1.0252 1.0354 1.0341 1.0222 1.0083 1.0421 1.0564 
 (7.48)*** (7.53)*** (7.55)*** (7.46)*** (7.37)*** (7.58)*** (7.71)*** 
Lossit-1 -0.2077 -0.2094 -0.2077 -0.2132 -0.2070 -0.2059 -0.1846 
 (-3.18)*** (-3.20)*** (-3.18)*** (-3.26)*** (-3.17)*** (-3.15)*** (-2.82)*** 
OOit-1 -0.3047 -0.3191 -0.3096 -0.3170 -0.3191 -0.2973 -0.3319 
 (-4.96)*** (-5.20)*** (-5.05)*** (-5.17)*** (-5.23)*** (-4.81)*** (-5.44)*** 
ROAit-1 -4.1347 -4.2393 -4.1139 -4.3205 -4.1454 -4.0992 -3.9643 
 (-14.76)*** (-14.87)*** (-14.59)*** (-15.34)*** (-14.79)*** (-14.70)*** (-14.25)*** 
Sigmait-1 -0.1768 -0.1834 -0.1803 -0.1738 -0.1823 -0.1766 -0.1845 
 (-1.98)** (-2.06)** (-2.02)** (-1.95)* (-2.04)** (-1.98)** (-2.07)** 
Sizeit-1 0.0547 0.0463 0.0533 0.0461 0.0520 0.0530 0.0372 
 (4.65)*** (3.99)*** (4.53)*** (3.97)*** (4.47)*** (4.54)*** (3.10)*** 
Slackit-1 0.0021 0.0031 0.0024 0.0024 0.0040 0.0004 0.0005 
 (0.13) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.03) (0.03) 
Slack_empit-1 6.9642 6.8953 6.9756 6.8769 6.9346 6.9993 7.0369 
 (4.92)*** (4.87)*** (4.93)*** (4.86)*** (4.89)*** (4.95)*** (4.98)*** 
CEO_ Deltait-1  -1.8095 -1.7047 -1.7861 -1.7106 -1.8054 -1.7947 -1.7234 
 (-3.97)*** (-3.76)*** (-3.92)*** (-3.77)*** (-3.97)*** (-3.94)*** (-3.78)*** 
CEO_Vegait-1 -0.0084 -0.0083 -0.0083 -0.0083 -0.0089 -0.0082 -0.0089 
 (-0.62) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.66) (-0.61) (-0.65) 
Ind. & Year 
Dummies	   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 
Psuedo R-square 0.4858 0.4852 0.4856 0.4857 0.4859 0.4861 0.4858 
*, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
The logit model used in this table is: DOCFit = α + γCONit-1 + Controlsit-1 + µit-1              (7), 
where CON = UC_PCA, CC_PCA, UC_ACC, UC_BM, UC_RES, CC_ACM, CC_ARA, or CC_CRA,  for Models 1 to 7.  Controls 
include Cash, ΔCash, Invest_CAPX, Invest_RD, Leverage, Loss, OO, ROA, Sigma, Size, Slack, Slack_emp, CEO_Delta, CEO_Vega,  
Ind and Year dummies.   
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Table 4  Fama-Macbeth Regression Estimation Results for Relations between 
Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and OCF Downside Risk Rlpm_OCF 
This table reports estimation results for the Fama-MacBeth regressions of OCF downside risk measure Rlpm_OCF 
on lagged unconditional and conditional conservatism metrics UC_PCA, UC_ACC, UC_BM and UC_RES, and 
CC_PCA, CC_ACM, CC_ARA and CC_CRA, respectively, as well as other control variables. T-statistics are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and first-order autocorrelations using the Newey-West procedure. Model 
specifications and variable definitions are presented at the bottom of this table and Table 1. 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 0.7760 0.7679 0.7752 0.7755 0.7694 0.7713 0.7774 
 (41.71)*** (42.85)*** (41.6)*** (43.85)*** (43.84)*** (43.25)*** (39.9)*** 
UC_PCAit-1 -0.0137    -0.0220 -0.0241 -0.0132 
 (-1.75)*    (-2.68)*** (-2.85)*** (-1.61) 
CC_PCAit-1 -0.0587 -0.0486 -0.0595 -0.0600    
 (-17.06)*** (-10.85)*** (-16.67)*** (-15.41)***    
UC_ACCit-1  -0.1911      
  (-3.58)***      
UC_BMit-1   -0.0044     
   (-0.76)     
UC_RES it-1    -0.0305    
    (-2.83)***    
CC_ACMit-1     -0.0221   
     (-6.29)***   
CC_ARAit-1      -0.0150  
      (-4.44)***  
CC_CRAit-1       -0.0812 
       (-14.95)*** 
Cashit-1 -0.0562 -0.0495 -0.0574 -0.0557 -0.0585 -0.0581 -0.0561 
 (-4.47)*** (-4.06)*** (-4.51)*** (-4.16)*** (-4.33)*** (-4.29)*** (-4.69)*** 
ΔCashit-1 0.0008 0.0012 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0052 -0.0058 0.0048 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.12) (-0.02) (-0.77) (-0.87) (0.7) 
Invest_CAPXit-1 0.0066 0.0032 0.0052 0.0023 -0.0042 -0.0051 0.0081 
 (0.28) (0.14) (0.22) (0.09) (-0.17) (-0.21) (0.35) 
Invest_RDit-1 -0.7066 -0.7187 -0.7160 -0.6605 -0.6964 -0.6928 -0.7094 
 (-24.06)*** (-23.14)*** (-23.5)*** (-21.34)*** (-22.63)*** (-21.69)*** (-23.91)*** 
Leverageit-1 0.0642 0.0606 0.0644 0.0625 0.0574 0.0576 0.0712 
 (13.94)*** (13.43)*** (14.05)*** (13.5)*** (12.61)*** (14.99)*** (17.39)*** 
Lossit-1 -0.0102 -0.0095 -0.0103 -0.0111 -0.0109 -0.0103 -0.0081 
 (-1.83)* (-1.76)* (-1.84)* (-2.01)** (-1.98)** (-1.88)* (-1.66)* 
OOit-1 -0.0203 -0.0182 -0.0204 -0.0201 -0.0266 -0.0275 -0.0166 
 (-2.28)** (-2.37)** (-2.29)** (-2.30)** (-2.80)*** (-2.87)*** (-1.95)* 
ROAit-1 -0.4341 -0.4565 -0.4347 -0.4454 -0.4158 -0.4061 -0.4258 
 (-19.46)*** (-17.02)*** (-20.22)*** (-18.96)*** (-20.45)*** (-19.48)*** (-19.01)*** 
Sigmait-1 -0.0174 -0.0186 -0.0177 -0.0175 -0.0186 -0.0190 -0.0183 
 (-2.41)** (-2.50)** (-2.43)** (-2.36)** (-2.46)** (-2.57)** (-2.75)*** 
Sizeit-1 0.0039 0.0038 0.0038 0.0038 0.0024 0.0015 0.0035 
 (2.68)*** (2.48)** (2.60)*** (2.44)** (1.51) (0.92) (2.28)** 
Slackit-1 -0.0038 -0.0053 -0.0036 -0.0026 -0.0048 -0.0066 -0.0083 
 (-1.36) (-1.61) (-1.28) (-0.83) (-1.76)* (-2.27)** (-2.40)** 
Slack_empit-1 0.2681 0.2580 0.2680 0.2729 0.3009 0.3080 0.2625 
 (3.16)*** (3.18)*** (3.16)*** (3.27)*** (3.15)*** (3.14)*** (3.17)*** 
CEO_ Deltait-1  -0.0986 -0.0985 -0.0974 -0.0965 -0.1011 -0.1015 -0.0973 
 (-6.20)*** (-6.22)*** (-6.14)*** (-6.26)*** (-6.81)*** (-6.44)*** (-6.22)*** 
CEO_Vegait-1 -0.0178 -0.0170 -0.0178 -0.0174 -0.0185 -0.0174 -0.0169 
	   (-0.96) (-0.95) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.97) (-0.97) (-0.96) 
Ind. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 
R-square 0.7940 0.7943 0.7940 0.7937 0.7906 0.7903 0.7960 
*, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
The Fama-Macbeth regression used in this table is: Rlpm_OCFit = α + γCONit-1 + Controlsit-1 + µit-1         (7),  
where CON = UC_PCA, CC_PCA, UC_ACC, UC_BM, UC_RES,CC_ACM, CC_ARA, or CC_CRA from Models 1 to 7, 
respectively. Controls include Cash, ΔCash, Invest_CAPX, Invest_RD, Leverage, Loss, OO, ROA, Sigma, Size, Slack, 
Slack_emp, CEO_Delta, CEO_Vega, Ind and Year dummies. 
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Table 5  Fama-Macbeth Regression Estimation Results for Relations between  
Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and OCF Downside Risk CFaR 
This table reports estimation results for Fama-MacBeth regressions of future operational cash flow at risk 
CFaR on lagged UC and CC metrics UC_PCA, UC_ACC, UC_BM and UC_RES, and CC_PCA, CC_ACM, 
CC_ARA and CC_CRA, respectively, and other control variables. T-statistics are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and first-order autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure. Model specification 
details and variable definitions are presented at the bottom of this table and Table 1, respectively. 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 0.6728 0.6510 0.6724 0.6712 0.6796 0.6616 0.6674 
 (18.04)*** (17.13)*** (17.88)*** (17.46)*** (18.49)*** (15.11)*** (16.84)*** 
UC_PCAit-1 -0.1068    -0.1093 -0.1171 -0.1121 
 (-10.69)**    (-11.47)*** (-11.77)*** (-10.96)*** 
CC_PCAit-1 -0.0448 -0.0211 -0.0494 -0.0534    
 (-11.28)** (-4.91)*** (-13.28)*** (-14.07)***    
UC_ACCit-1  -0.5526      
  (-14.24)**      
UC_BMit-1   -0.0668     
   (-8.94)***     
UC_RES it-1    -0.1038    
    (-2.21)**    
CC_ACM it-1     -0.0502   
     (-11.56)**   
CC_ARAit-1      -0.0008  
      (-0.08)  
CC_CRAit-1       -0.0261 
       (-3.66)*** 
Cashit-1 -0.1534 -0.1451 -0.1595 -0.1600 -0.1524 -0.1563 -0.1555 
 (-9.10)*** (-9.4)*** (-9.59)*** (-9.15)*** (-8.88)*** (-9.09)*** (-8.98)*** 
ΔCashit-1 0.0214 0.0229 0.0220 0.0175 0.0172 0.0165 0.0206 
 (2.97)** (2.84)** (3.06)*** (2.6)** (3.07)*** (3.08)*** (2.68)** 
Invest_CAPXit-1 -0.2975 -0.3190 -0.2988 -0.3233 -0.2984 -0.3109 -0.3035 
 (-6.06)*** (-6.99)*** (-5.95)*** (-6.22)*** (-6.11)*** (-5.98)*** (-6.02)*** 
Invest_RDit-1 -0.6074 -0.6889 -0.6578 -0.4908 -0.5996 -0.5948 -0.6013 
 (-5.79)*** (-6.53)*** (-6.31)*** (-2.72)*** (-5.74)*** (-5.81)*** (-5.76)*** 
Leverageit-1 0.1455 0.1366 0.1485 0.1415 0.1424 0.1426 0.1447 
 (8.71)*** (7.86)*** (8.92)*** (7.75)*** (8.32)*** (8.03)*** (8.12)*** 
Lossit-1 0.0170 0.0197 0.0171 0.0156 0.0165 0.0167 0.0174 
 (2.91)*** (3.15)*** (2.95)*** (2.75)*** (2.70)*** (2.99)*** (3.17)*** 
OOit-1 -0.0533 -0.0491 -0.0542 -0.0538 -0.0576 -0.0584 -0.0553 
 (-6.68)*** (-7.25)*** (-6.80)*** (-6.78)*** (-7.05)*** (-6.86)*** (-7.07)*** 
ROAit-1 -0.0461 -0.1156 -0.0343 -0.0842 -0.0397 -0.0239 -0.0332 
 (-0.61) (-1.41) (-0.46) (-1.23) (-0.54) (-0.34) (-0.44) 
Sigmait-1 -0.1664 -0.1714 -0.1676 -0.1686 -0.1662 -0.1686 -0.1681 
 (-10.58)** (-11.15)** (-10.56)** (-11.31)** (-10.66)** (-11.1)*** (-11.08)** 
Sizeit-1 -0.0236 -0.0263 -0.0238 -0.0265 -0.0244 -0.0249 -0.0245 
 (-3.95)*** (-4.23)*** (-4.09)*** (-4.32)*** (-4.08)*** (-3.77)*** (-3.99)*** 
Slackit-1 0.0116 0.0085 0.0117 0.0138 0.0143 0.0094 0.0086 
 (3.19)*** (2.61)*** (3.19)*** (4.06)*** (3.41)*** (2.95)*** (2.69)*** 
Slack_empit-1 0.2324 0.1873 0.2412 0.2322 0.2393 0.2700 0.2542 
 (0.87) (0.75) (0.9) (0.91) (0.91) (0.98) (0.93) 
CEO_ Deltait-1  -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0025 
 (-0.91) (-0.92) (-0.93) (-0.98) (-0.93) (-0.91) (-0.91) 
CEO_Vegait-1 0.0040 0.0087 0.0087 0.0195 0.0052 0.0064 0.0072 
 (0.14) (0.33) (0.3) (0.71) (0.19) (0.23) (0.26) 
Ind. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,018 27,018 27,018 27,018 27,018 27,018 27,018 
R-square 0.4012 0.4017 0.3993 0.3986 0.4011 0.3990 0.3998 
*, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
The Fama-Macbeth regression used in this table is: CFaRit = α + γCONit-1 + Controlsit-1 + µit-1,        (7) 
where CON = UC_PCA, CC_PCA, UC_ACC, UC_BM, UC_RES,CC_ACM, CC_ARA, or CC_CRA from Models 1 to 7, 
respectively. Controls include Cash, ΔCash, Invest_CAPX, Invest_RD, Leverage, Loss, OO, ROA, Sigma, Size, Slack, 
Slack_emp, CEO_Delta, CEO_Vega, Ind and Year dummies. 
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Table 6  Cash and Relations between Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and 
OCF Downside Risk Estimated by 3SLS Models 
This table reports estimation results for 3SLS regressions for relations between unconditional and conditional 
conservatism UC_PCA and CC_PCA, cash holdings Cash, and OCF downside risk Rlpm_OCF. Model 
specifications are provided at the bottom of the table and variable definitions are presented at Table 1. 
Independent 
Variable 
3SLS Model for  
the Full Sample 
3SLS Model for Sample without R&D 
Expenditures 
1st-stage 
UC 
Model 
1st-stage 
CC 
Model 
2nd-stage 
Cash Model 
3rd-stage 
Rlpm_OCF 
Model 
1st-stage 
UC 
Model 
1st-stage 
CC 
Model 
2nd-stage 
Cash Model 
3rd-stage 
Rlpm_OCF 
Model 
Intercept  0.1449 0.6476 0.2401 0.7483 0.1291 0.6807 0.2330 0.8368 
 (19.94)*** (35.79)*** (33.23)*** (86.84)*** (13.22)*** (28.70)*** (27.30)*** (69.43)*** 
UC_PCAit-1 0.7306    0.7194    
 (196.06)***    (140.01)***    
CC_PCAit-1  0.1883    0.1954   
  (31.38)***    (24.39)***   
UC_PCA_Rit-1   0.0165 0.0420   0.0136 0.0510 
   (2.55)** (5.31)***   (1.77)* (4.69)*** 
CC_PCA_Rit-1   0.0120 -0.0259   0.0143 -0.0171 
   (4.52)*** (-8.48)***   (4.33)*** (-3.79)*** 
Cashit-1 -0.0073 -0.1289   0.0013 -0.1207   
 (-1.23) (-8.86)***   (0.14) (-5.57)***   
Cash_Rit-1    -0.0655    -0.1273 
    (-8.24)***    (-9.74)*** 
UC_PCA_Rit-1    -0.1763    -0.3082 
* Cash_Rit-1    (-2.94)***    (-2.87)*** 
CC_PCA_Rit-1    0.0082    0.0482 
* Cash_Rit-1    (0.32)    (1.10) 
Rlpm_OCFit-1 -0.0896 -0.3365       
 (-15.68)*** (-23.87)***       
ΔCashit-1   0.0004    0.0146  
   (0.56)    (4.72)***  
Dissue it-1   0.0862    0.0951  
   (5.53)***    (5.23)***  
DIV it-1   0.1912    0.2561  
   (4.63)***    (5.26)***  
NWC it-1   -0.1359    -0.1442  
   (-30.19)***    (-24.61)***  
Invest_CAPXit-1   -0.0025 0.0017   -0.1168 -0.0630 
   (-1.48) (0.83)   (-6.89)*** (-2.73)*** 
Invest_MAit-1   -0.1407    -0.1202  
   (-5.99)***    (-4.20)***  
Invest_RDit-1   0.4790 -0.7640    -0.8156 
   (27.26)*** (-36.70)***    (-10.34)*** 
Leverageit-1 -0.0016 0.1862 -0.2556 0.0718 -0.0022 0.1351 -0.2361 0.0977 
 (-0.29) (13.52)*** (-43.91)*** (10.82)*** (-0.30) (7.94)*** (-36.12)*** (10.97)*** 
Lossit-1   0.0150 -0.0149   0.0231 -0.0151 
   (5.14)*** (-4.42)***   (6.33)*** (-3.02)*** 
OOit-1   -0.0791 -0.0176   -0.1442 -0.0397 
   (-29.48)*** (-5.71)***   (-24.61)*** (-9.39)*** 
ROAit-1 -0.1069 -0.2163 0.0220 -0.4107 -0.0780 -0.2918 -0.0580 -0.4002 
 (-12.65)*** (-10.32)*** (1.74)* (-29.45)*** (-5.60)*** (-8.75)*** (-18.39)*** (-16.75)*** 
Sigmait-1   0.0184 -0.0124   0.1014 -0.0102 
   (4.52)*** (-2.55)**   (5.58)*** (-1.42) 
Sizeit-1 0.0047 0.0195 -0.0065 0.0023 0.0066 0.0177 0.0122 0.0091 
 (10.46)*** (17.74)*** (-12.58)*** (3.99)*** (9.90)*** (11.28)*** (2.43)** (9.98)*** 
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Slackit-1   0.0009 0.0004   -0.0089 -0.0006 
   (2.66)*** (0.73)   (-13.10)*** (-0.57) 
Slack_empit-1   0.0033 -0.0016   0.0004 0.0073 
   (0.77) (-0.31)   (1.14) (0.36) 
CEO_ Deltait-1  -0.0328 -0.0632 0.1043 -0.1230 -0.0308 -0.0732 0.0033 -0.2170 
 (-1.59) (-1.25) (5.07)*** (-5.03)*** (-1.19) (-1.20) (0.88) (-6.79)*** 
CEO_Vegait-1 -0.0008 -0.0020 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.1390 0.0032 
 (-1.25) (-1.22) (-1.31) (-1.45) (-0.33) (-0.16) (6.14)*** (2.58)*** 
Ind. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,566 27,566 22,112 22,112 15,360 15,360 12,393 12,393 
R-square 0.6647 0.1191 0.3399 0.7766 0.6554 0.1142 0.2872 0.7702 
*, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
The 3SLS model consists of the following three equations. The first-stage regression model is: 
CONit = α0 + α1 CONit-1 + α2 Cashit-1 + α3 ROA it-1 + α4 Sizeit-1 + α5 Leverageit-1 + α6CEO_Deltait-1 + α7CEO_Vegait-1 +  (8) 
α8Rlpm_OCFit-1 + ΣbmIndm + ΣbnYearn + υit-1,   
where CON = UC_PCA or CC_PCA. Residuals from this first-stage regression, UC_PCA_R  and CC_PCA_R are used in the 
second and third-stage regressions. 
The second-stage regression model is: 
Cashit = b0 + b1 UC_PCA_Rit-1 + b2 CC_PCA_Rit-1 + Controls11it + εit, (9) 
where Controls1 includes lagged Cash, Dissue, DIV, Leverage, Loss, NWC, OO, ROA, Sigma, Size, Slack, Slack_emp, 
CEO_Delta, CEO_Vega, Year and Ind. dummies. 
The third-stage regression model is: 
Rlpm_OCFit = γ0 + γ1Cash_Rit-1*UC_PCA_Rit-1 + γ2Cash_Rit-1*CC_PCA_Rit-1 + γ3UC_PCA_Rit-1 + γ4CC_PCA_Rit-1     (10) 
                        + γ5Cash_Rit-1 + Controls2it-1 + µit, 
where Cash_R refers to residual for Cash from the second-stage. Controls2 are the same as in Model (7). 
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Table 7  Hedging and Relations between Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and 
OCF Downside Risk Estimated by Extended Three-Stage Heckman Models 
This table reports estimation results for the three-stage Heckman models for the effects of  hedging usage on the 
relations of OCF downside risk proxied by Rlpm_OCF with unconditional and conditional conservatism UC_PCA 
and CC_PCA,. Model specifications are provided at the bottom of the table and variable definitions are presented at 
the bottom of Tables 1 and 2. 
Independent  
Variables 
Extended Three-Stage Heckman Model 
1st-stage UC Model 1st-stage CC Model 2
nd-Stage Probit 
Model for Hedger 
3rd-Stage Model  
for Rlpm_OCF 
Intercept  0.0747 0.4794 -1.3732 0.6147 
 (9.86)*** (26.24)*** (-14.16)*** (27.98)*** 
UC_PCAit-1 0.7234    
 (152.55)***    
CC_PCAit-1  0.1596   
  (20.23)***   
UC_PCA_Rit-1   -0.1587 -0.0120 
   (-1.64)* (-0.98) 
CC_PCA_Rit-1   0.0705 -0.0465 
   (1.77)* (-9.40)*** 
Hedger   0.0170 0.0110   
 (7.20)*** (1.98)**   
Hedger*post    -0.1040 
    (-6.02)** 
Post    0.1035 
    (5.68)*** 
UC_PCA_Rit-1*Hedger    0.0577 
*post    (2.34)** 
CC_PCA_Rit-1*Hedger    0.0062 
*post    (0.67) 
Rlpm_OCFit-1 -0.0612 -0.2712   
 (-14.94)*** (-27.53)***   
INT_BDit-1   0.0041  
   (1.21)  
Invest_RDit-
1*Leverageit-1 
  
3.9362  
   (2.11)**  
NOLit-1   0.0045  
   (0.10)  
BASit-1   -10.1451  
   (-11.96)***  
Cashit-1    -0.0573 
    (-5.57)*** 
ΔCashit-1    -0.0025 
    (-1.34) 
Invest_CAPXit-1    0.0021 
    (1.04) 
Invest_RDit-1   -0.4089 -0.7206 
   (-1.23) (-24.11)*** 
Leverageit-1 0.0064 0.2454 0.6895 0.0509 
 (0.90) (14.54)*** (7.35)*** (5.30)*** 
Lossit-1    -0.0114 
    (-2.46)** 
OOit-1    -0.0108 
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    (-2.61)** 
ROAit-1 -0.1065 -0.3328 1.4424 -0.0428 
 (-9.09)*** (-11.79)** (8.31)*** (-21.61)*** 
Sigmait-1   -0.0848 -0.0125 
   (-1.32) (-1.94)* 
Sizeit-1 0.0048 0.0272 0.0441 0.0086 
 (8.29)*** (19.75)*** (5.47)*** (9.07)*** 
Slackit-1    0.0003 
    (0.51) 
Slack_empit-1    0.0071 
    (0.85) 
CEO_ Deltait-1  0.0256 -0.1087 -1.7097 -0.1948 
 (0.92) (-1.65)* (-4.82)*** (-5.74)*** 
CEO_Vegait-1 0.0028 -0.0021 0.0446 0.0038 
 (1.85)* (-0.57) (2.50)** (1.98)** 
Mills    0.0722 
    (6.89)*** 
Ind. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,250 16,250 13,391 12,068 
Pseudo R_square   0.1054  
R_square 0.6657 0.1441  0.7772 
*, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
The three-stage Heckman model used in this table consists of the following three equations. 
The first-stage OLS model is: 
CONit = α0 + α1CONit-1 + α2 Rlpm_OCFit-1 + α3ROA it-1 + α4Sizeit-1 + α5Leverageit-1 + α6CEO_Deltait-1 + α7CEO_Vegait-1 (11) 
+ α8Hedgeri + ΣbmIndm + ΣbnYearn + υit-1, 
where CON = UC_PCA or CC_PCA.  Residuals from this first-stage regression, UC_PCA_R and CC_PCA_R, are used in the 
second and third-stage regressions: 
The second-stage probit model is: 
Hedger = b0 + b1UC_PCA_Rit-1 + b2CC_PCA_Rit-1 + Controls3it + εit,          (12) 
where Controls3 include INT_BD, Invest_RD, Leverage, Invest_RD*Leverage, NOL, ROA, Sigma, Size, BAS, CEO_Delta, 
CEO_Vega, Ind and Year. 
The third-stage difference-in-differences OLS model is: 
Rlpm_OCFit = γ0 + γ1UC_PCA_Rit-1* Hedgeri*Post + γ2CC_PCA_Rit-1* Hedgeri*Post + γ3UC_PCA_Rit-1 + (13) 
 γ4CC_PCA_Rit-1 + γ5Hedgeri*Post + γ6Posti + γ7Millsit-1 + Controls4it-1 + µit, 
where Mills refers to the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the second-stage probit model, and Controls4 refers to other control 
variables as in Model (7). POST is a dummy variable equal to one for the first and second year after initiating the hedging 
program, and zero otherwise. The third-stage OLS Model  uses observations prior to initiating a hedging program and 
observations of non-hedging firms as the control sample. 
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Table 8  Downside Cash Flow Beta and Relations between Unconditional and Conditional 
Conservatism and OCF Downside Risk Estimated by 3SLS Models 
This table reports estimation results for the last stage of 3SLS models that regresses Rlpm_OCF against the 
interactions of downside cash flow beta and unconditional or conditional conservatism and other control 
variables. Downside cash flow beta is represented by Dcfbeta1 and Dcfbeta2. 3SLS model specifications are 
provided at the bottom of the table and variable definitions are presented at the bottom of Table 1. 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 
The 2nd-
Stage UC 
Model 
The 2nd-
Stage CC 
Model 
The 3rd-
Stage 
Rlpm_OCF
it Model  
The 2nd-
Stage UC 
Model 
The 2nd-
Stage CC 
Model 
The 3rd-
Stage 
Rlpm_OC
Fit Model  
Intercept 0.0556 0.3467 0.7583 0.0556 0.3467 0.7582 
 (9.69)*** (22.75)*** (90.78)*** (9.69)*** (22.75)*** (90.77)*** 
UC_PCA_Rit-1* Dcfbeta1_Rit-1   -0.1004    
   (-2.34)***    
CC_PCA_Rit-1*Dcfbeta1_Rit-1   -0.0253    
   (-1.43)    
UC_PCA_Rit-1*Dcfbeta2_Rit-1      -0.1023 
      (-2.35)** 
CC_PCA_Rit-1*Dcfbeta2_Rit-1      --0.0264 
      (-1.47) 
Dcfbeta1_Rit-1 0.0092 0.0290 0.0079    
 (2.04)** (2.47)** (1.45)    
Dcfbeta2_Rit-1    0.0100 0.0302 0.0077 
    (2.20)** (2.53)** (1.41) 
UC_PCA_Rit-1 0.7737  -0.0130 0.7737  -0.0130 
 (196.1)***  (-1.65)* (196.10)***  (-1.66)* 
CC_PCA_Rit-1  0.2066 -0.0621  0.2066 -0.0621 
  (31.91)*** (-20.70)***  (31.91)*** (-20.69)*** 
Cashit-1   -0.0591   -0.0592 
   (-7.64)***   (-7.64)*** 
ΔCashit-1   0.0008   0.0008 
   (0.82)   (0.82) 
Invest_CAPXit-1   0.0018   0.0018 
   (0.88)   (0.88) 
Invest_RDit-1   -0.7282   -0.7282 
   (-34.61)***   (-34.62)*** 
Leverageit-1 -0.0147 0.1765 0.0567 -0.0147 0.1765 0.0567 
 (-2.69)*** (12.33)*** (8.20)*** (-2.69)*** (12.32)*** (8.20)*** 
Lossit-1   -0.0135   -0.0134 
   (-4.00)***   (-3.99)*** 
OOit-1   -0.0159   -0.0159 
   (-5.06)***   (-5.06)*** 
ROAit-1 -0.0736 -0.0995 -0.4258 -0.0736 -0.0996 -0.4257 
 (-8.13)*** (-4.16)*** (-30.69)** (-8.13)*** (-4.16)*** (-30.69)*** 
Sigmait-1   -0.0123   -0.0123 
   (-2.53)**   (-2.54)** 
Sizeit-1 0.0052 0.0211 0.0022 0.0052 0.0211 0.0022 
 (11.77)*** (18.56)*** (4.08)*** (11.78)*** (18.56)*** (4.08)*** 
Slackit-1   0.0005   0.0005 
   (0.97)   (0.96) 
Slack_empit-1   -0.0017   -0.0017 
   (-0.35)   (-0.34) 
CEO_ Deltait-1    -0.1305   -0.1306 
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   (-5.57)***   (-5.57)*** 
CEO_Vegait-1   -0.0012   -0.0011 
   (-1.57)   (-1.57) 
Ind. Dummies Yes Yes Yes   Yes 
Observations 23,438 23,438 22,004 23,438 23,438 22,003 
R-square 0.6867 0.1002 0.7765 0.6874 0.1002 0.7800 
*, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
The 3SLS models used in this table are as follows. The first-stage OLS model is: 
Shockit = γ0 + γ1UC_PCAit-1 + γ2CC_PCAit-1 + γ2SIZEit-1 + γ3Leverageit-1 + γ4ROAit-1 + γ5Shockit-1 + γ6 CEO_Deltait-1    (14) 
+ γ7 CEO_Vegait-1 + ΣbmIndm + ΣbnYearn + µit 
where CON = UC_PCA and CC_PCA, Shock = Dcfbeta1 and Dcfbeta2. The estimated residuals from this stage, Shock_R, are 
used in the later stage regressions. 
The second-stage OLS regressions model is: 
CONit = α0 + α1CONit-1 + α2SIZEit-1 + α3Leverageit-1 + α4ROAit-1 + α5Shockit-1 + α6 CEO_Deltait-1  (15) 
+ α7 CEO_Vegait-1 + ΣbmIndm + ΣbnYearn + µit,  
where CON = UC_PCA and CC_PCA. Estimated residuals from this stage, UC_PCA_R and CC_PCA_R, are used in the later 
stage regressions. 
The third-stage OLS model is: 
Rlpm_OCFit = β0 + β1UC_PCA_Rit-1*Shock_Rit-1 + β2CC_PCA_Rit-1*Shock_Rit-1 + β3UC PCA_Rit-1 +  (16) 
   β4CC PCA_Rit-1 + β5Shock_Rit-1 + Controls5it-1 + εit 
where Controls5 are the same as in Model (7). 
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Table 9  Robustness Check for Relations between Unconditional and Conditional 
Conservatism and OCF Downside Risk  
This table reports estimation results for regressing alternative OCF downside risk on unconditional and conditional 
conservatism metrics and other control variables in Panel A, and for regressing Rlpm_OCF on alternative 
conditional conservatism measure CC_Skew and CC_PCAA and other controls in Panel B. In particular, Models 1 to 
6 use Rlpm_OCFind, Rlpm_OCFzero, Rlpm_OCFpre, Rlpm_OCF2, and Rlpm_OCF3 as alternative OCF downside 
risk measures . Model specifications and definitions of alternative OCF downside risk measures are provided at the 
bottom of the table, and other variable definitions are presented at the bottom of Table 1. 
Panel A: Alternative OCF Expectation Model for RLPM-based OCF Downside Risk Measures 
Variables 
Fama MacBeth Regression Models for Alternative OCF Downside Risk Measures 
Model 1: 
Rlpm_OCFind 
Model 2: 
Rlpm_OCFzero 
Model 3: 
Rlpm_OCFpre 
Model 5: 
Rlpm_OCF2 
Model 6: 
Rlpm_OCF3 
Intercept 0.8882 0.8374 0.5892 0.5994 0.5299 
 (56.48)*** (47.3)*** (14.28)*** (26.8)*** (24.28)*** 
UC_PCAit-1 -0.1643 -0.1756 -0.0677 -0.0359 -0.0811 
 (-17.99)*** (-22.97)*** (-5.14)*** (-7.67)*** (-20.73)*** 
CC_PCAit-1 -0.1771 -0.1899 -0.1693 -0.1165 -0.1136 
 (-52.49)*** (-78.04)*** (-35.61)*** (-52.53)*** (-47.73)*** 
Other Controls	   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
obs 22,456 22,456 22,456 30,337 30,337 
R-sqr 0.5667 0.5449 0.1686 0.3725 0.3266 
Panel B: CC_Skew as Alternative Conditional Conservatism Measures  
Variables 
Logit Model for Indicator of 
OCF Downside Risk DOCF 
Fama MacBeth Model for 
Rlpm_OCF 
Fama MacBeth Model for 
OCF at Risk CFaR 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 0.8718 0.9115 0.7594 0.7546 0.8303 0.8181 
 (5.74)*** (5.94)*** (37.80)*** (36.86)*** (10.89)*** (10.37)*** 
UC_PCAit-1 -0.4568 -0.4874 -0.0070 -0.0149 -0.1036 -0.1014 
 (-4.92)*** (-5.26)*** (-0.85) (-1.76)* (-15.98)*** (-17.34)*** 
CC_PCAAit-1 -0.0770  -0.0779  -0.0783  
 (-1.36)  (-5.89)***  (-7.36)***  
CC_Skewit-1  0.0271  -0.0677  -0.1261 
  (0.44)  (-3.66)***  (-4.66)*** 
Other Controls	   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
obs 28,425 28,425 28,425 28,425 24,554 24,554 
Psuedo R-sqr 0.4857 0.4857     
R-sqr   0.7955 0.7924 0.4258 0.4271 
*, **, and *** indicate a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level, respectively.  
The model used in this table is: DRit = α + γCONit-1 + Controlsit-1 + µit-1  (7) 
where DRit = DR_OCFind, DR_OCFpre, DR_OCFzero, Rlpm_OCF2it, Rlpm_OCF3it, and Rlpm_OCFit. CON = UC_PCA, 
CC_PCA, CC_PCAA, CC_SKEW.  Controls include Cash, ΔCash, Invest_CAPX, Invest_RD, Leverage, Loss, OO, ROA, Sigma, 
Size, Slack, Slack_emp, CEO_Delta, CEO_Vega, Ind and Year dummies. DR_OCFind, DR_OCFpre, DR_OCFzero refer to the 
RRLPMs of OCF recalculated by replacing the OCF expectation model in equation (5) with previous year industry OCF mean, 
previous five-year mean of firm-specific OCF, and zero OCF. We define Rlpm_OCF2 as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
RLPM of OCF without deflating by the RUPM of OCF, and define Rlpm_OCF3 as the natural logarithm of one plus the RLPM 
of OCF alternatively deflated by the standard deviation of OCF calculated over a horizon of three to five years. 
 
